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PENSION PLAN DESIGN—CANADA

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This session will outline principles of Pension Plan Design with emphasis on the Canadian scene.

MR. A. DAVID PELLETIER: We will open with a brief overview of the pension system as it currently stands in Canada.

- Mix of public and private programs
- Public Programs
 - Canada/Quebec Pension Plans (C/QPP)
 - Old Age Security (OAS)
 - Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS)
 - Provincial Income-Tested Programs
- Private Programs
 - Pensions; in 1978
 - 4.2 million members (44% - 54% coverage)
 - 15,000 plans
 - about \$45 billion in assets
 - Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSP's); in 1976
 - 1.3 million contributors
 - \$1,638 average annual contribution
- Regulation
 - Federal -- Revenue Canada's 72-13R6
 - Provincial -- Pension Benefits Acts
Human Rights Legislation

MR. SHIRAZ Y.M. BHARMAL: Pension plan design has various factors operating on it. I have classified those factors into three main categories: "philosophical"; the internal factors; and the external factors.

The philosophical aspects reflect the corporate culture in which the employer is operating: the attitude of the employer to the pension issue and labour relations; his perception of the role of pensions. The internal factors reflect the circumstances of the employer and the employee group. The external factors comprise the environment within which the employer is operating.

Philosophical Factors

This is where most of the controversy is concentrated as views vary from employer to employer. Is a pension plan a production of income for employees and therefore a welfare plan? Is it a deferred wage? Is it part of the compensation package? Is it a reward for long service? Is it a manpower planning tool for systematic retirement of older employees? To what extent does the employer consider pension as a partnership with the employee.

Internal Factors

1. Employee Profile -- is the make up of the employee group, not only now but in the foreseeable future. What is the age mix of the employee group? Obviously if people are all very young, in their 20's and 30's, the pension is not such a big issue with them. The distribution of sex is a consideration that may be changing quite a lot with changing realities: career women; greater participation in the labour force; two earnings families. Sex distribution is still important from the point of view that women do tend to live longer and therefore the cost of their pension is higher. Are they a mature group? Are they short or long service employees? Is the average pay comparable to the average national wage? If so, substantial benefits are already being provided through social security. The sophistication and type of employees is also a factor. There is no point in designing a pension plan which is a masterpiece of a model if nobody understands it, or can't relate to it, or administer it.
2. Employer Profile. Corporate size is a factor. The nature of industry the employer operates is also a very important consideration. If the employer's profit margins are low and it is a very labour intensive type of business then the employer has to be much more concerned about the costs of the pension plan. Union involvement is a factor. Are all employees unionized? If some are and some aren't then we may have a double-barrelled effect in that the non-unionized employees will tend to want to get what the unionized employees have got and vice versa.
3. Employee attitudes. Employees now tend to be more in a "demand" position, they think about pensions and other benefits, rightly or wrongly, as deferred wages. If the employee attitudes do not jell with the employer objectives there may be some need for a communication or an education task.
4. Income replacement objectives. How much of the pre-retirement income is the employer going to replace, in conjunction with other sources? What are the other sources he would take into account: employee's own savings, house, government benefits, etc?
5. The nature of existing benefits. Quite often when designing a pension plan you are already in a situation where there is an existing benefit program. There might be a profit sharing plan or a thrift plan or even indeed a pension plan which is being reviewed. This might impact on the pension design.

6. Cost consideration. The ability of the employer to deal with the costs of the plan, now and in the future will have a bearing. This may well decide whether he elects a final average plan or a career average plan, for example.

External Factors

1. Competitive practices. This includes the competitive practices of the employers in the same industry or in the same locale or who recruit from the same group of employees.
2. Government regulations. There is a proliferation of forms, minimum standards, disclosure laws, etc.
3. Taxation. One of the ways the governments provide an incentive for establishment of a pension plan is to provide a favourable tax environment. This impacts on the design of the pension plan.
4. Societal pressures: the changing moods of how society views the role of the employer in providing retirement income benefits. There is a school of thought that believes that the employer has to bear the general requirements of the society in mind in providing pensions.
5. Union objectives. Unions, especially the large ones, have certain objectives about what they want from their pension packages from the various employers. This tends to have a general impact directly or indirectly.
6. Social Security benefits: their level and availability.

MR. PELLETIER: Shiraz has talked about various factors for employers to take into account in designing a pension plan. One of those factors, of course, is going to be the needs of an employee when he retires. What we are going to do here then is examine one way of developing adequate replacement ratios for retiring employees. The replacement ratio being the ratio of pension income to his pre-retirement earnings on a before tax basis but developed taking into account changes in tax status, expenditure patterns, and so on.

There are a number of reasons why a replacement ratio of 100% is perhaps needlessly generous:

- The income tax situation of the individual changes when he retires; he likely will be in a lower tax bracket and various tax credits come into play at age 65.
- Required statutory benefit contributions (C/QPP and UIC) disappear.
- Medicare premiums in Ontario and Alberta are no longer required from the individual after age 65.
- Contributions to the company pension plan, group insurance and various other benefits disappear.

- Work related expense (commuting, business or work clothes, extra car, downtown luncheon) disappears.
- Presumably an active employee has been saving part of his income. When he retires there is no need to provide pensions large enough to enable the individual to continue to save at the same level.
- Savings patterns vary widely from individual to individual, but in a number of cases any mortgage on a house would perhaps be paid up by that point in time.
- Increased leisure time after retirement may result in additional expenses for travel or recreation.

Now, we can take all these factors into account and make a number of assumptions to develop an appropriate retirement ratio.

- Retirement age: 65
- Ontario resident
- Single, or married with non-dependent spouse
- Pension contribution = 5% of gross pay, including C/QPP contribution (maximum \$3,500)
- Work-related expense = 5% of gross pay (maximum \$2,000)
- Savings = 1% of net income for each \$1,000 of net income; < 20%; includes after-tax pension contribution
- Winding down of mortgage payments, etc. cancels out increased travel/recreation, etc.
- Savings not drawn on after retirement

After making these assumptions, we come up with the results shown in Table A.

What we've said is that the net preretirement income available for consumption can be a guideline for after tax pension income. Then we have taken this number and worked backwards to find out what gross pension income has to be provided to provide the net after tax income. This net after tax income is then divided by the final pay to produce the replacement ratio.

As you would expect, these replacement ratios are higher for the lower income people and then grade down. They start moving up again as you move to the high income levels, because of the effects of income tax, and the savings and work-related expense assumptions. For purposes of pension plan design I think you tend to focus on the pattern shown by the low to middle income levels more than the pattern shown at the highest income levels. These are guidelines for a total replacement ratio, including all sources of income. We haven't yet talked about what part of the total is going to come from government benefits. A private plan might look to these ratios first as being a total objective, but the next step would be to ask how much of this is provided by government?

TABLE A

<u>Final Pay</u>	<u>Payroll Deductions</u>	<u>Net Income</u>	<u>Other Savings</u>	<u>Work-Related Expense</u>	<u>Income Avail. for Consumption & After-Tax Pension Income Target</u>	<u>Gross Pension Required</u>	<u>Replacement Ratio</u>
\$12,500	\$ 2,831	\$ 9,669	\$ 481	\$ 625	\$ 8,563	\$ 8,988	71.9%
20,000	5,343	14,657	1,508	1,000	12,149	13,872	69.4%
40,000	14,058	25,942	4,110	2,000	19,832	25,028	62.6%
80,000	35,100	44,900	7,446	2,000	35,455	53,486	66.9%

Payroll Deductions = Income Tax
 + C/QPP
 + UIC
 + Medicare
 + Pension Contributions

As I touched on briefly earlier, in Canada there are four sources of government benefits; the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan, Old Age Security, the Guaranteed Income Supplement and various provincial income tested programs. These benefits can be summarized as follows:

-- C/QPP

-- Coverage

- all employees and self-employed
- ages 18 - 65

-- Maximum Pensionable Earnings (MPE)

- \$13,100 in 1980
- catching up to average industrial wage

-- Contributions

- 1.8% x (pensionable earnings - 10% YMPE)

-- Retirement age

- 65 or later
- no means test

-- Retirement benefit (conceptually 3-year final average)

- maximum is 25% of 3 year final average MPE
- actual is (maximum) x (career average of $\frac{\text{salary}}{\text{MPE}}$)
- each ratio $\frac{\text{salary}}{\text{MPE}} < 1$
- 15% lowest ratios dropped from calculation

-- Retirement benefits in payment indexed to CPI, annually

-- Also disability and survivor income benefits

-- Fully taxable

-- Maximum monthly retirement benefit in 1980 = \$244.44

-- OAS

-- All Canadian residents age 65

-- Full benefit if 40 years in Canada between 18 and 64

-- Prorated for fewer years in Canada

-- Indexed quarterly to CPI

-- Fully taxable

-- Monthly benefit at January 1, 1980 = \$182.42

-- GIS

-- Income-tested federal program

-- Same eligibility as OAS

-- Maximum monthly benefit (payable if no income other than OAS), at January 1, 1980 = \$149.76 (single), \$124.52 each (married couple)

- Benefit reduced 50¢ for each \$1.00 of other non-OAS income
- Non-taxable
- Provincial Income-Tested Programs
 - Alberta, B.C., Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Saskatchewan
 - On top of GIS
 - Results in total income-tested benefit reductions of \$1.00 for each \$1.00 of outside income
 - Non-taxable

	<u>Annual Incomes</u>	
	<u>Single</u>	<u>Married</u>
Poverty Line 1979 (Statistics Canada low income cut-off)	\$4,844	\$7,020
Maximum CPP & OAS (January 1, 1980)	5,117	7,306
Maximum OAS & GIS (January 1, 1980)	3,984	7,386
Maximum OAS & GIS & GAINS (Ontario) (January 1, 1980)	4,453	8,665
Industrial Composite Average Earnings (October 1979)	\$15,425	
Average Family Income (Preliminary estimates 1978)	\$21,346	

MR. BHARMAL: Having gone through the exercise as to what is required to replace 100% of the pre-retirement income, and having identified as to what the government benefits are providing, what is it that a private pension has to provide to maintain that 100% replacement income? This is the initial adequacy when a person retires. Quite often, of course, the employer will not be in a position to, or philosophically will not want to provide a 100% replacement because of all the factors that we talked about earlier. But what this illustration will show is the upper limit for an adequacy target which the employer could aim at if his objective was that the employee should have the same standard of living after his retirement as before. The gross income required for 100% replacement is not 100% of the pre-retirement gross income. If you accept the illustrations that Dave provided, the replacement ratios are less than 100% and vary with final pay level. For example, at \$12,500, 72% of the gross income would replace 100% of the net income, and at the \$20,000 final pay level something like 69% or at \$40,000 63%. We can express these as formulas including government benefits:

55% to 60% of the final pay including the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan plus the Old Age Security benefits

or

55% to 60% of final pay plus 50% of all the government benefits (the Old Age Security and the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan).

These standards were derived from the total income requirements and include the government benefit provisions and the portion to be provided from the employee's own savings. The state already provides the Old Age Security plus the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan, so the employee and employer together have to provide something like

60% minus the benefit from the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan

or alternatively:

60% of the final pay minus one-half of all government benefits.

That gives you some sort of a benchmark, reduced to a single index, as to an acceptable level of benefits that a private pension plan should provide for a 100% replacement.

Pension Formulas

There are various formulas that will allow us to achieve this particular benchmark. For example, there is the final average pay where the pension at the retirement date is expressed as a percentage of the average of salary in the final three or five or ten years or whatever, the career pay average where the benefit is expressed as the percentage of the average of pay during the career of the employee, and the career pay plus updates which is a career pay formula that is upgraded every few years in line with inflation erosion. The flat rate benefit formula is usually found in union type pension plans where simplicity is the key-note. Benefits are expressed as so many dollars per month for each year of service and are upgraded periodically at the negotiating table. There is also the money purchase benefit where, instead of defining the benefit in terms of income, you define the benefit as the outcome of a regular accumulation of savings during the career of the employee. And then there are, of course, combinations of all sorts.

These formulas do have pros and cons. I will give some examples. The advantage of a final pay formula, of course, is that it keeps pace with inflation and you do not have to readjust it; the disadvantage is that there is a lack of cost control because you cannot predict inflation. The career pay benefit will allow you to keep control over your costs because the benefits, once determined, do not increase. On the other hand, there is an erosion due to inflation. The flat rate plan which one might think has the same characteristics as the career pay plan does not really because of the presence of the union and the whole negotiation stance. However, the problem there is the future proliferation of costs, because typically the benefits are upgraded for all service at each negotiation and the cost for the past service has to be met. The money purchase benefit is very easy to understand but has unpredictable benefits.

Cost Sharing

Should the plan be contributory or non-contributory? In Canada, one has to bear in mind the very important incentive provided by the tax deductibility of the employee contributions to a registered pension plan. A large number of pension plans in Canada, as already pointed out, tend to be contributory. On the other hand, there has been greater resistance on the part of the employees because of the current debate and current change in social attitudes. There is also some question as to the interest credited on employee contributions and the whole nature of pension plans. The availability of the Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) must also be taken into account. The RRSP's are very similar to the U.S. IRA's except that in Canada even an employee who has a pension plan can contribute to the RRSP. The RRSP allows the employee to be master of his own money and does not involve employer risk. However, there is no "locking in" or guarantee that the employee will not dissipate those monies prior to retirement.

If the employer decides to provide a non-contributory benefit, the employee is in a greater position to save. Should his objective then be less than the 100% retirement income replacement?

Integration Methods

Generally, the integration methods in Canada (to account for government benefits) fall into three broad categories.

1. Offset Methods. The government benefit is a direct offset from a gross payment. This offset may take into account the whole of the government benefits -- 100% of Old Age Security and Canada/Quebec Pension Plan -- or it could be a partial offset. Under the partial offset it may offset only one element of the social security in Canada, for example, only the Old Age Security or only the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan. It can also be a percentage of both government benefits such as 50% or 60% or 40%. The other thing to consider is whether the offset should be prorated by service for short service employees. There are also various provincial regulations which would impact on how you would apply the offset methods.
2. Additive Methods. These tend to be more popular in Canada. Under additive methods, the government benefits are not directly offset but you have a formula such that the impact is as if you were reducing the total gross income by the government benefits. There are various methods used in Canada. The step rate method provides for the accrual of benefits up to the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan ceiling at a lower rate than the accrual rate for earnings in excess of that. The other method used is called the "excludable portion" of earnings where the first \$x of the benefits are excluded from calculating your pension benefit. The latter has to be upgraded periodically to keep pace with the government benefit increases.
3. Stacked Methods. This is a non-integrated benefit because it does not take account of the government benefits directly, however in setting the objectives the employer will obviously take account of what is available in the government sector.

The factors in choosing integration methods that have to be considered are:

1. The implications on company cost. One of the advantages of the offset method is that the potential company cost is kept control of. If the government portion of benefits are increased, they are an automatic reduction to the employer's benefit, and at the same time I assume the employer's contribution to social security would increase.
2. The total benefit level control. If the social security benefits are increased and you are using an additive method, you are now providing excessive benefits compared to your objective.
3. Canadian practice. Canadian practice tends to favour the additive step rate approach.
4. Employee viewpoint. This is very important. In the offset plan, quite often, if the communication has not been done properly as to the objectives of the pension plan, the offset is often taken by the employee to be a snatching away of some of the government provided benefits.
5. Simplicity both of administration and of communication.

Other Features in Developing Formulas

1. Period of service for prorating maximum pension. In Canada, partly because of the leadership of the public sector, as well as the way Revenue Canada describes its maximum pension rule, 35 years is a common practice. However, because of the increased mobility and shorter lifetime careers with employers, these prorating periods tend to now range between 25 and 40 years.
2. Pay Averaging Period. In Canada three or five years are common pay averaging periods in final pay plans mainly because of the tendency for pay levels to taper off before retirement age. This has not been quite true in the past few years because of very high inflation.
3. Retirement Age. At what age should an unreduced benefit be provided? Is it 60, 65, 70 or whatever and if it is prior to 65 should there be any actuarial reduction? Should there be a bridge for government benefits? Should there be a subsidized early retirement benefit for long service employees? One of the recommendations in the Lazar study is that you should not provide a subsidized benefit to long service employees because that tends to take away from short service employees.
4. Risk allocation. This is a very important point which is sometimes not taken into account. The formula that we elect will allocate the risk of the benefit either to the employee or the employer. For example, if the method chosen is the money purchase method the risk is taken completely by the employee because he will be completely at the mercy of how the markets do and the annuity rates or the interest rates at the time retirement takes place. On the other hand, if you provide a final average defined benefit plan, the

employer is taking all the risks. There is also some tendency to provide what they call a mixed type of formula where you would provide the employer portion as a defined benefit but a money purchase benefit for the employee's money.

Some final pay formulas which would achieve 100% replacement objective are illustrated below. All of these assume a 35 year career for maximum accrual.

1. 1.8% of Final Average Pay
minus
1.5% of OAS/C/QPP benefits
multiplied by
years of service.
2. 1.0% of Final Average Pay up to C/QPP average ceiling
plus
1.8% of excess average pay
multiplied by
years of service.
3. 1.8% of Final Average Pay
minus
3% of C/QPP benefits
multiplied by
years of service.

MR. PELLETIER: Shiraz has talked about adequacy at the point of retirement. Another important part of adequacy is how long will the pensions provided continue to be adequate. Adequacy at the minute the employee retires may not do him much good 10 or 20 years later, and it won't do his spouse any good either after he is dead unless an adequate provision has been built into his pension benefits for his spouse as well. So we are going to talk about two aspects of continuing adequacy, the first being inflation.

We often talk about inflation and what it does in eroding pension benefits and so on, but I think sometimes as actuaries we tend to look at it more from an academic, compound interest point of view, rather than looking at the real numbers. A pension of \$100 a month back in 1969 would really be worth only \$48 a month now; that just has to have a major impact on the standard of living of such a pensioner.

For several reasons, it is not necessarily correct to argue that full protection up to the full CPI should be provided. One argument that was raised by Geoffrey Calvert is that in old age some needs decline and various types of expenses wind down. He came up with an estimate of 2% per year. A second aspect, another issue that Calvert has been taking up, is that really the CPI is not that good a measure of people's needs. First, it may not be a good measure of the real increase in cost of living for everybody because of problems in the way it is measured; and secondly, it may not be that good for the needs of retirees specifically. The third factor is that, where an individual is getting a fairly large pension, perhaps you want to provide protection only for the income that is needed to provide for basic needs.

Other factors to take into account include the fact that government benefits, C/QPP, OAS and GIS, are fully indexed. In deciding how to provide this protection the employer will be concerned about the cost of opening his cheque book for the future without having any idea of what it is going to cost him. However, the retiree is going to feel a lot better if he does not have to be concerned about inflation. Those are obviously conflicting concerns.

Various approaches have been utilized to handle this problem. When indexing is done it is related to the CPI in some fashion. A deductible approach provides indexing up to the CPI less some percentage, for example 3%. A shared approach provides for benefit increases up to say a half or a third of inflation. A cap approach provides protection up to a certain level of inflation but no further. A fourth approach would be to index only part of the pension rather than all of it. Of course, any number of combinations of all four of these methods can be employed in any given plan.

The employer's cost control objectives can be accomplished by making all his increases ad hoc. One desirable way is to develop a policy as to when to provide increases and how often. This policy can be related to outside criteria such as pension fund earnings, the performance of the company, the performance of the stock, price-earnings ratio, or some other such criterion.

From the point of view of the retiree, unlimited indexing would be ideal. The plans in Canada that have provided this unlimited peace of mind to the retirees (not to the taxpayers) are the public service plans. An ad hoc approach that will give the retirees some peace of mind is what I call here a "commitment to review"; where the employer who stops short of unlimited indexing will make a commitment to his retirees that the situation of pensioners will be regularly reviewed based on published objective criteria. The retirees have some assurance that this is the objective of the employer and that there is a defined procedure by which the employer is carrying out the program.

The second aspect of adequacy that I mentioned was protection for the dependent spouse. Providing adequacy just while the bread winner is alive can mean a seriously impoverished widow or widower. Not enough encouragement is currently being made to provide a continuing benefit to the spouse following the death of the retiree. This can be done in various ways:

- Make it automatic, with or without a reduction in the amount of the benefit. This is pretty rare in Canada, although under the new rules in Saskatchewan it is going to be required.
- Utilize modified actuarial reduction factors. Instead of reducing the pension by the full actuarial factors, perhaps use half the factors, say 92-1/2% instead of 85%, or develop some sort of other formula such as paying 95% of the normal pension to the retiree with 55% of the 95% continuing to the spouse on his death.

Communicating the importance of a survivor option to the employee and counselling the employee to take advantage of that feature is also essential.

MR. BHARMAL: I will quickly discuss other design considerations.

1. Termination of Employment. One of the biggest considerations in designing a pension plan, especially in today's environment of greater sensitivity to the mobile employee, is what benefits should be provided on termination of employment? When should vesting occur? Should the vested benefit be locked in? That means that a vested employee cannot take his benefit or commute it in cash but has to take it as a pension upon retirement. Should there be a minimum benefit? In contributory plans there has been criticism that in the earlier years the employee's contributions provide all the benefits so that the short service employee does not receive any advantage of the employer contributions if he terminates before the employer contributions become a factor in that pension. Saskatchewan has decreed that at least 50% of the deferred pension must be provided from employer contributions. The question of portability has to be resolved. Will you allow transfers to other plans, and that can be costly depending on the factors and the methods used, etc? Are you going to enter into any portability arrangements or have provisions for reciprocal service credits? What attempts, if any, will be made to maintain the real value of deferred benefits in light of inflation?
2. Interest Credits on Employee Contributions. How are you going to credit interest to the employee contributions? Again, Saskatchewan will decree from 1981 onwards, a minimum rate that should be credited to the employee contributions.
3. Disability Benefits. The pension plan is often used for disability and death benefits because of tax considerations. In designing a pension plan, questions will arise as to whether ancillary benefits should be provided from the pension plan or not. When designing the disability benefits, the question arises, which is the most effective vehicle, the insured plan or the pension? If there is an insured plan, how is it to be coordinated with the pension plan benefits? What is the definition of disability? What benefit levels should be provided given that there are government sources of benefit for disability pensions as well and should there be any eligibility requirements based on age or service?
4. Death Benefits. If those are to be provided from the pension plan, are they going to be in the form of a surviving spouse's benefit or orphan children's benefit or a lump sum? What are the tax implications? Is the lump sum to be limited to a refund of contributions? How is the whole death benefit being coordinated with any other life insurance program with the employer?

MR. PELLETIER: There are constraints imposed by government to be taken into account in designing a plan, both to insure that the employer gets tax deductibility of his contributions and also that it meets with the various requirements of the provinces. A very brief outline of these requirements is as follows:

- Federal - Revenue Canada's 72-13R6
 - Pension plan cannot be a savings plan
 - Retirement benefits payable as annuities, not lump sums
 - Maximum benefits after 35 years service:
 Lesser of - \$60,000
 - 70% final 3-year average
 - Normal retirement ages: 60 to 71
 - Guaranteed period: up to 15 years (or age 86 if less)
- Provincial - Human Rights Legislation
 - Prohibits discrimination by age, sex, marital status, race, etc.
 - Many exceptions
- Provincial - Pension Benefits Acts in Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan (and Federal)
 - Vesting: age 45 and 10 years (Manitoba: 10 years)
 - Locking in: age 45 and 10 years
 - Value of benefit \geq employee contributions
 - Continuation of service with successor employer
- Provincial - Amendments Proposed to Saskatchewan's PBA
 - Vesting: age and service \geq 45, and 1 year
 - Locking in: age and service \geq 45, and 1 year
 - Automatic post retirement spouse's option; only spouse can rescind
 - Minimum rate of interest on employee contributions
 - 50% vested benefit purchased by employee contributions.

MR. BHARMAL: I will just highlight some of the current issues that are being debated in Canada which will obviously impact on the plan designs in the future.

- Extent of coverage -- small employers
- Adequacy of benefit levels:
 - role of government
 - employer plans
 - individual savings

- Continuing adequacy after retirement -- Impact of inflation
- Women and pensions in a changing society
- Mobile employees
 - vesting
 - portability
 - locking-in
 - effect of inflation on vested benefits
- Financing
 - public plans (social security)
 - employer plans (public service and private)
- Excellent benefits for public sector employees versus mediocre benefits for private sector employees.

In the recent years, there has been a plethora of studies. Some of these are summarized here:

- Cofirentes + -- a committee appointed by the Quebec government to report on the financing of the Quebec Pension Plan as well as private employers plans.
- The "Lazar Report" -- The Retirement Income System in Canada: Problems and Alternative Policies for Reform -- a study by the federal government inter-departmental task force.
- The Royal Commission on the Status of Pensions in Ontario -- report yet to be published.
- Pensions and Survival. The Coming Crisis of Money and Retirement -- a study by Geoffrey N. Calvert.
- One in Three - Pensions for Canadians to 2030 -- The Economic Council of Canada.
- The "Croll Report" -- Retirement without Tears -- The report of the Special Senate Committee on Retirement Age Policies.
- The Tomenson-Alexander report on Financing of the Federal Public Service pension plans.
- Canada at the Pension Crossroads -- a study by Keith H. Cooper and Colin C. Mills of TPF&C for the Research Foundation of the Financial Executives Institute.
- Public and Private Pensions in Canada - a study by J.E. Pesando and S.A. Rea, Jr. for the Ontario Economic Council.
- Mandatory Retirement Policies -- Conference Board in Canada.

All these studies should give way to government action -- both at provincial and federal levels -- in the coming years. For example, the Saskatchewan government has already enacted legislation, which will be effective July 1, 1981, expanding its pension law. The federal government

has promised to sponsor a national pension conference in late 1980 -- the Lazar study will no doubt be the catalyst. The other government studies -- Cofirentes + in Quebec and the much awaited Royal Commission report in Ontario -- will no doubt have significant impact.