
The Economic Aspects of Life Insurance Backdating

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- For these purposes, only reviewed when used to "save" age
- Example: Person age 36 and 2 months



Restricted by jurisdiction

 Additional limitations set by both regulators and companies

Of interest to all involved parties

Incentive for agent

Incentive for company

When is it advantageous for the consumer?

 For a consumer, the expected NPV (including the effect of the chargeback) for backdating a policy must be positive

 Key affecters are expected persistency, mortality, and interest rates

 Persistency of backdated policies tends, as expected, to be better than non-backdated policies

Policy Year	1	2	3	4	5
Ratio of Lapse Rates	70%	76%	78%	80%	82%
(Backdated : Non-Backdated)					


- Despite the obvious effect on product pricing, backdating is not explicitly accounted for in pricing processes at most U.S. life insurance companies
- ALB companies tend to experience considerably less backdating than ANB companies
- Experience also varies by AOI

 Price discrimination inherent from the prohibition of backdating is due to the charging consumers with equal expected marginal costs different prices for an equivalent product


 Thus, life insurance with annual mortality pricing represents third-degree price discrimination

- Additional issues come out of the supplyside response to backdating:
 - » Profit-maximization is NOT the primary focus of most pricing processes
 - » Focus on return-based pricing methods is given additional advocacy from the use of percentile analysis for assessing solvency
 - » Resulting profit levels will be substandard





Economic Effect of Return-Based Profit Goals



 Given the emphasis on return-based pricing, supply side responses can be expected to deal with returns falling below targets

 Much of this occurs due to failures within the industry to properly account for backdating in product pricing

- Some supply-side responses include:
 - » Raising minimum policy size requirements
 - » Price increases via lowering benefits from non-guaranteed elements
 - » Subsidizing in force policies with new business production
 - » More accurate UW classification through more detailed and UW and more UW classes

Conclusions:

- ➤ Backdating exists as a market response to the inherent price discrimination of discrete, annual pricing for life insurance policies
- ➤ Technological limitations that previously held companies to discrete, annual pricing have been largely removed
- ➤ Over time, backdating should give way to pricing life insurance in shorter increments of mortality