



#### Session 91, Medicaid Margin Assumptions – Opening the Black Box

SOA Antitrust Disclaimer
SOA Presentation Disclaimer

# 2019 Health Meeting

Session #091: Medicaid Margin Assumptions – Opening the Black Box

June 25, 2019





#### Welcome

- Session #091: Medicaid Margin Assumptions Opening the Black Box
- Session is being broadcasted live nationally
- Questions will be taken at the end of the session via Chat
  - Microphones for those in the room
- Note Antitrust Statements and Presentation Disclaimer on following slides
- With regard to this subject specifically, underwriting gain and the managed Medicaid capitation rate development process remain exercises that are unique and independent to each MCO, based on MCO-specific inputs; this presentation, accompanying paper and the Model are intended solely as thought tools and methodological suggestions.



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## **Introductions**

Presenter	Experience Highlights
Michelle Raleigh, ASA, MAAA	<ul> <li>Vice President of Actuarial Services at Centene</li> <li>25 years focused on Medicaid</li> <li>Co-authored the ASOP 49 on Medicaid Managed Care Rate Development</li> </ul>
Sabrina Gibson, FSA, MAAA	<ul> <li>Chief Medicaid Actuary at WellCare Health Plans</li> <li>13 years focused on Medicaid</li> <li>Co-authored the ASOP 49 on Medicaid Managed Care Rate Development</li> </ul>
Jaredd Simons, ASA, MAAA	<ul> <li>Director of Actuarial Services at Centene</li> <li>7 years focused on Medicaid</li> <li>Senior State Actuary prior to joining Centene</li> </ul>
Jim Piekut, FSA, MAAA	<ul> <li>Staff VP &amp; Actuary II at Anthem</li> <li>12 years focused on Medicaid</li> </ul>



# Agenda

- Overview
- Cost of Capital
- Risk Margin
- Considerations
- UWG Model
- Questions
- Closing



# Overview






# Background


- State actuaries estimate MCOs' costs when developing capitation rates
  - Includes Underwriting (UW) Gain green and yellow slices of pie
- UW Gain Actuarial Guidance
  - Per Actuarial Standard of Practice (ASOP) #49, UW Gain provides "compensation for the risks assumed by the MCO", and needs to reflect:
    - 1. Cost of capital (CoC)
    - 2. Margin for risk or contingency (risk margin or RM)
  - CMS acknowledges importance
  - Historical lack of transparency
  - SOA Risk Margin Study (published in 2017) emphasized need to quantify
  - Incorporated in other industry rates

Medicaid Rate Components





## Background, cont.



- Actuaries formed a workgroup to "Open the Black Box"
- Primary goal is to foster discussions within the profession
  - Share revelations such as instances where
     UW Gain ≠ Net Income
- Today our charge is to:
  - Discuss MCOs' cost of capital, solvency, and acceptable levels of risk
  - Demonstrate how Medicaid contract features, such as minimum MLR requirements, impact the need for margin
  - Share newly-developed models



# **Cost of Capital**





## Why Cost of Capital is Required

# MCO invests capital in a Medicaid program

Must earn a return on the capital to pay:

- \$ Interest on debt
- \$ Returns to investors
- \$ Additional Costs not funded in the capitation rates


**Cost of Capital:** The return an MCO expects to receive for investing in a Medicaid program.



#### Why Cost of Capital is Required Return on Investment Investors Pay Other Debt Loans **Funds** Capital to Funded Pay **Additional Participate** Income **Investors** in Medicaid Claims Program **Program** Value Added Pay Benefits Revenue Capitation Funded Other Unfunded **Payments** Administration Administration Costs Costs




## Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)





#### Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) Converted to Pre-Tax





#### Components of WACC and Sources

#### RISK FREE RATE

- Assumed Risk Free Rate of Return
- Source: US Treasury Rate

# MARKET EXPECTED RETURN RATE

- Rate of Return Required by MCO Investors
- Source: 10-year or longer average rate of return or expected forecasted rate of return from PIMCO, Wellington, or Voya

#### BETA

- Measure of an MCO's Stock's Volatility of Returns Relative to the Entire Market
- Source: MCO's historical beta from Bloomberg

#### **COST OF DEBT**

- MCOs' Assumed Debt Interest Rate
- Source: Publically traded MCO's debt rates are posted on Bloomberg


#### **TAXES**


- MCO Expected Federal and State Income Tax Rates
- Source: Government Sources



#### Risk Free Rate Example


#### **Historical Treasury Rates**







#### Market Rate of Return Example





#### **Beta Source**

Raw Bet	Raw Beta (slope) vs. S&P 500 Index:									
Per	iod:	WCG	CNC	мон	ANTM	UNH	CI	Avg	Min	Max
1	yr	0.925	1.053	0.939	0.872	1.011	0.873	0.946	0.872	1.053
3	yr	0.904	1.116	0.994	0.938	0.931	0.886	0.962	0.886	1.116
5	yr	1.014	1.096	1.028	0.908	0.971	0.848	0.978	0.848	1.096

Avg: 0.962 Max: 1.116 Min: 0.848

as of 12/21/2018

Source: Bloomberg

0.85 - 1.12

3.9% - 5.4%

# Cost of Debt Source

Average Cost of Debt

WCG 5.31%

CNC 5.38%

MOH 4.06%

ANTM 4.19%

UNH 3.88%


CI 4.37%

as of 4/19/19

Source: Bloomberg



#### **Current Ranges**





#### **Capital Determination**

- Invested capital is:
  - Start up costs (usually not funded by states and not considered in the Model)
  - Equity held by MCO as required by the state DOI or other agencies
- RBC/Equity are amounts of RBC, performance bonds, or other equity held by MCOs
- Minimum requirements:
  - NAIC RBC Minimum = 200%
  - Some states require higher amounts
- MCOs hold more than the minimum required, so RBC/Equity does not drop below minimum required levels during the normal course of business
- "Ruin" for an MCO can be viewed as losses exceeding certain levels of RBC



#### Capital Determination, cont.

- RBC/Equity used in Model is:
  - Actual amounts held by MCOs in the program, or
  - Estimate assuming 100% of RBC/Equity ≈ 3.5% 4% of Revenue
- RBC/Equity Ratio is the percentage of revenue that the MCOs hold as RBC/Equity
  - Example: 350% RBC X 4% of Revenue = 14% RBC/Equity Ratio
- Load applied in capitation rates:

Cost of capital load =  $RBC/Equity\ Ratio \times WACC$ 



### **Cost of Capital Model Inputs**

COST OF CAPITAL INPUTS				
WACC Components				
Risk Free Rate	2.8%			
Market Expected Return	13.2%			
Beta	0.940			
Cost of Debt (Borrowing Rate) 5				
Capital Structure				
Debt % of Total	20%			
Equity % of Total	80%			
Tax Rate				
Federal	21.0%			
State	5.0%			
RBC/Equity Ratio - average held by MCOs*	0.121			
Minimum RBC/Equity Ratio**	0.100			
200% RBC/Equity Ratio***	0.070			

Model User Inputs in Blue

- RBC / Equity Held ≈ 350%
- State Regulatory Minimum ≈ 285%
- NAIC Minimum ≈ 200%

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> NAIC minimum RBC is 200%



<sup>\*</sup> Note: 100% of RBC/Equity is ~3.5% - 4.0% of revenue (factor of 0.035-0.04)

<sup>\*\*</sup> State Regulatory Agency Minimum RBC or equivalent

### Cost of Capital Model Outputs

#### **COST OF CAPITAL**

Equity Risk Premium		
Market Expected Return		13.2%
Risk Free Rate	-	2.8%
Equity Risk Premium	=	10.4%

Tax Rate	
Federal Tax Rate	21.0%
State Tax Rate	5.0%
Total Tax Rate	25.0%

Cost of Equity						
Equity Risk Premium		10.4%				
Beta	Χ	0.94				
Risk Free Rate	+	2.8%				
After Tax Cost of Equity	=	12.6%				
After Tax Yield (1 - Tax Rate)	÷	<u>75.1%</u>				
Cost of Equity (Before Tax)		16.8%				

Weighted Average							
Cost of Capital (WACC)							
		Weight		Rate			
Cost of Equity		80%	Χ	16.8%			
Cost of Debt	+	20%	Χ	5.0%			
WACC	=			14.4%			

WACC = 14.4%

Capitation Rate Compone	ent	
Required Capital : Prem Ratio		0.121
WACC	Х	14.4%
UW Gain: Cost of Capital		1.74%
	1	$\overline{\overline{}}$

Cost of Capital Load = 1.74%

**Before Tax Adjustment** 



# Risk Margin





### Margin for Risk & Contingency (Risk Margin)

All projections are wrong WHY IS Risk adjustment is not perfect Risk Adverse selection MARGIN Administrative expense deviation Size of MCO enrollment REQUIRED? Minimum MLR remittance limits upside risk Asymmetric risk corridors Losses reduce capital reserves Unknown unknowns

<sup>\*</sup> Items in Red have specific discussions later in presentation.



#### Drivers of Risk Margin




- Difficult to quantify each risk (blue boxes)
- Program specific items need to be taken into account (red boxes)
- Capital infusions needed when experiencing a loss (Green Box)
- The actuary needs to understand the probability of gain or loss in the program
- MCO financial filings provide insight into the probability



### Quantifying Risk Margin

MCO Net Income is similar to UW Gain in the rates

- Data Observations:
  - Best fit is a Normal distribution
  - Volatility varies with the size of the plan enrollment





#### **Estimation of Variance**

$$\sigma^2 = \alpha + \frac{\omega}{member\ months}$$

- Variance decomposed into:
  - Constant (irreducible) variance  $(\alpha)$
  - Variance that decreases with scale (ω)
- Parameters are estimated from the data (Normal distribution)
  - μ = UW Gain load
- Considers variability between states to avoid overstating variance



#### **Predicting MCO Results**

Initial MCO Experience								
Claims	(	Claims	lni	tial Ne	t Income			
Loss Ratio	Ex	penses	Р	MPM	Percent	Density	Probability	
84.40%	\$	271.93	\$	11.40	3.5%	12646.6	1.26%	
84.50%	\$	272.26	\$	11.08	3.4%	12778.4	1.28%	
84.60%	\$	272.58	\$	10.76	3.3%	12896.8	1.29%	
84.70%	\$	272.90	\$	10.44	3.2%	13001.4	1.30%	
84.80%	\$	273.22	\$	10.11	3.1%	13091.8	1.31%	

Posterior Predictive Distribution calculated by averaging over posterior samples of  $\alpha$ ,  $\omega$ 

For modeling purposes, all variance in results is attributed to claims



# Considerations





## What is Risk Sharing in Medicaid?

- Any mechanism that shares risk between the managed care organization (MCO) and the state, altering the fullrisk arrangement
- Mechanisms apply at the individual MCO level

Examples of risk sharing	Not examples
Minimum medical loss ratios (MLRs)	Risk adjustment
Risk Corridors	Risk pools
Profit Cap	
Stop Loss	




# Risk Sharing Impact on UW Gain

- ASOP 49: 3.2.16:
  - "Minimum Medical Loss Ratios The actuary should consider governmental and contractual minimum medical loss ratio requirements as well as the sharing of gains or losses. Such provisions may affect the underwriting gain provision component of the capitation rates."
- Risk sharing can alter the expected value of an MCO's UW gain
- Expected value of UW gain can be maintained if risk sharing is considered
- Why engage in risk sharing just to counteract it?



## Example: 1 MCO


Pre-tax Net Income Distribution with  $\mu = 2\%$ ,  $\sigma = 4\%$ 





# Example: 1 MCO

Pre-tax Net Income Distribution with  $\mu = 2\%$ ,  $\sigma = 4\%$ ; max PTNI = 6%






## Example: 1 MCO

- When the pre-tax net income, X, is constrained to a maximum, b:
  - $E(x) = P(x < b) \times E(x|x < b) + P(x \ge b) \times b$
- When X  $\sim$  N( $\mu$ ,  $\sigma^2$ ) and constrained to b, E(x) in Excel:
  - =NORM.DIST(b, $\mu$ , $\sigma$ ,TRUE) \* ( $\mu$   $\sigma$  \* NORM.DIST((b- $\mu$ )/ $\sigma$ ,0,1,FALSE) / NORM.DIST((b- $\mu$ )/ $\sigma$ ,0,1,TRUE)) + (1-NORM.DIST(b, $\mu$ , $\sigma$ ,TRUE))\*b
- Initial adjustment to counteract minimum  $MLR = \mu E(x)$



## Example: 1 MCO

Pre-tax Net Income with  $\mu$  = 2%,  $\sigma$  = 4%, max PTNI = 6%






## Items that Affect the Adjustment

- The target MLR's proximity to the minimum MLR
- Variability in results
  - Population or program maturity
  - Level of aggregation in risk sharing
  - Claim cost predictability



## Example: 3 MCOs

Pre-tax Net Income with  $\mu_1$  = 2%,  $\sigma_1$  = 4%;  $\mu_2$  = -2%,  $\sigma_2$  = 3%;  $\mu_3$  = 4%,  $\sigma_3$  = 5%




PRE-TAX NET INCOME



### Example: 3 MCOs

$$\mu_1 = 2\%$$
,  $\sigma_1 = 4\%$ ;  $\mu_2 = -2\%$ ,  $\sigma_2 = 3\%$ ;  $\mu_3 = 84\%$ ,  $\sigma_3 = 4\%$ ; max PTNI = 6%



PRE-TAX NET INCOME



## Example: 3 MCOs

- Some MCOs may chronically underachieve or overachieve, causing there to be different means
  - Different means increase the expected industry-wide remittances
- MCOs' performance would likely be positively correlated, as all MCOs face the same pricing risks
- Could use historical MCO remittances to approximate additional amounts needed to counteract minimum MLR
- Some MCOs are more likely to be impacted by minimum MLRs, but any premium adjustment should affect all MCOs equally



#### Withholds in Medicaid

- "Withholds" refer to the withholding of part of the premium to be returned to an MCO, in part or in full, if the MCO can achieve some objectives (i.e., quality measures). MCOs may be required to share withholds with providers.
- The attainability of recovering withholds varies by the program
- ASOP 49 3.2.15 Performance Withholds and Incentives
  - "3.2.15 Performance Withholds and Incentives—The actuary should consider how the existence of the withholds and incentives will affect the plan costs, including claims and administration costs. The *capitation rates* should reflect the value of the portion of the withholds for targets that the *MCOs* can reasonably achieve."
- 42 C.F.R. §438.6(b)(3)
  - "Contracts that provide for a withhold arrangement must ensure that the capitation payment minus any portion of the withhold that is not reasonably achievable is actuarially sound as determined by the actuary."



## Measuring Reasonable Achievability

- Use prior years' experience
- If no prior experience available
  - Assess how MCOs would have measured up to standards and assess withhold-driven behavior changes
  - Use data from other states
- No matter the method, looking for E(return of withhold)



### Example

- Objective: maintain intended expected UW gain, while allowing withhold to incentivize MCO behavior
- Example
  - $E(return \ of \ withhold) = 75\%$
  - Withhold = 2% of premium
  - *Sharing with provider* = 50%
  - $E(loss\ of\ premium) = 75\% \times 2\% \times 50\% + 25\% \times 2\% = 1.25\%\ of\ premium$
  - Load for withhold =  $Premium \times \left(\frac{1}{1-E(loss\ of\ premium)} 1\right) = Premium \times \left(\frac{1}{1-1.25\%} 1\right) = 1.27\%\ of\ Premium$



#### Conclusion

- UW gain adjustments due to risk sharing or withholds are based on a shared premise:
  - the actuary should set UW gain based on their assessment of the cost of capital and risk margin
  - outside forces such as risk sharing and withholds may change the expected distribution of pre-tax net income, but adjustments should be made to the UW gain to preserve the intended expected value



#### **Capital Infusions**

#### Losses reduce MCO capital reserves

Capital must be raised to replenish the reserves

#### Cost to raise capital is similar to initial cost of capital

- Small losses are unlikely to change the cost of raising capital
- Large losses may have adverse impacts on a company's ability to raise capital and the cost of that capital (Not considered in Model)

# Model reflects the additional cost of capital incurred when a scenario results in a loss

Cost of capital infusion = PMPM Loss x WACC



#### Risk Margin Model

CAPITATION RATE COMPONENT	
UW Gain: Margin for Risk and Contingency	0.90%
UW Gain: Cost of Capital Infusions	0.06%

RATE DEVELOPME	NT I	NPUTS	
Rate Development Point Estimates	F	РМРМ	% of Premium
Expected Net Income (Before Tax)	\$	6.67	2.00%
Premium (Capitation Rate) Withhold Unachieved	\$	333.32 (1.67)	-0.50%
Expected Claims Expense	(	(285.54)	-85.67%
Expected Admin Expense		(31.28)	-9.38%
Premium Tax Expense		(7.50)	-2.25%

KEY STATISTIC SUMMARY											
Net Income Drivers	F	РМРМ	% of Premium								
Gain / (Loss)	\$	6.87	2.06%								
Cost of Capital Infusions		(0.20)	<u>-0.06%</u>								
Realized Net Income (Before Tax)	\$	6.67	2.00%								
MLR Min/Max Statistics	Во	oundary	Probability								
Minimum MLR		85.0%	9.20%								
Maximum MLR		N/A	-								

Components of UW Gain determined using the probability model

Summary of rate development – Used to determine net income

Claims expense is replaced in each scenario

Gain / (Loss) = Net income before raising additional capital

Cost of capital infusions is not captured on common reports



#### Risk Margin Model

(Part 1 of 2)

					AY	VERA	AGE OF SC	EN.	ARIOS						
	Ir	nitial MCO I	Experien	се						ILR	Formula				
Claims	Claims	Initial Net	Income						MLR	Def	fined	МСО	Capped	Transf	er Payment
Loss Ratio	Expenses	PMPM	Percent	Density	Probability	QI	Expenses	Nu	merator	De	nominator	MLR	Loss Ratio	Expense	/ (Recievable)
85.67%	\$ 285.54	\$ 7.33	2.20%	1000000.0	100.00%	\$	4.63	\$	290.17	\$	325.82	89.06%	89.20%	\$	0.46
					UNIQ	QUE I	MODELED S								
	<u> </u>	nitial MCO I	Experiend	ce		_	Re	<u>emi</u>	ttance M	<u>ILR</u>	Formula				
Claims	Claims	<b>Initial Net</b>	ι Income						MLR	Def	fined	MCO	Capped	Transf	er Payment
Loss Ratio	Expenses	PMPM	Percent	Density	Probability	QI	Expenses	Nu	merator	<sup>1</sup> De	enominator	MLR	Loss Ratio	Expense	/ (Recievable)
50.00%	_\$ 166.66	_\$ 126.21	_ 37.9%	0.0	0.00%	_\$	4.63	_\$	171.29	_\$	325.82	52.57%	_ 85.00%	_\$	105.66
					·	'		•		•	······	<b></b>			
78.90%	\$ 262.99	\$ 29.88	9.0%	1095.3	0.11%	\$	4.63	\$	267.62	\$	325.82	82.14%	85.00%	\$	9.33
79.00%	\$ 263.32	\$ 29.55	8.9%	1174.4	0.12%	\$	4.63	\$	267.95	\$	325.82	82.24%	85.00%	\$	8.99
79.10%	\$ 263.65	\$ 29.22	8.8%	1258.2	0.13%	\$	4.63	\$	268.28	\$	325.82	82.34%	85.00%	\$	8.66
			<b>*</b>			'		•		•		<b>"</b>		•	
91.60%	\$ 305.32	\$ (12.45)	-3.7%	1906.7	7 0.19%	\$	4.63	\$	309.95	\$	325.82	95.13%	95.13%	\$	- :
91.70%	\$ 305.65	\$ (12.78)	-3.8%	1789.6	0.18%	\$	4.63	\$	310.28	\$	325.82	95.23%	95.23%	\$	-
91.80%	\$ 305.98	\$ (13.11)	-3.9%	1678.2	2 0.17%	\$	4.63	\$	310.61	\$	325.82	95.33%	95.33%	\$	-
	<b></b>				. <b>"</b>	<b>'</b>		•		•		<b></b>		•	
150.00%	\$ 499.98	\$ (207.10)	-62.1%	0.0	0.00%	\$	4.63	\$	504.61	\$	325.82	154.87%	154.87%	\$	-
	4														
Ŋ	Modeled [	Experien	ce	Pro	bability			A	Applicat	ion	of MLR C	aps and	d Transfer	Paymen <sup>*</sup>	t



#### Risk Margin Model

(Part 2 of 2)

	AVERAGE OF SCENARIOS												
	Capped MCO Experience												
Claims	~		Claims	Adı	min & Prem Tax Gain / (Loss)		C	ost of Capital		Net I	ncome		
Loss Ratio	~		Expenses		Expenses	Р	MPM	% Revenue		Infusions	Pl	MPM	% Revenue
85.35%	~	\$	286.00	\$	38.78	\$	6.87	2.06%	9	(0.20)	\$	6.67	2.00%

					UNIQUE MO	DE	LED SC	ENARIOS						
				Capp	ed MCO Experie	nc	e							
Claims	~	Cla	aims & Transfer	Adr	nin & Prem Tax		Gain	/ (Loss)		Cos	st of Capital		Net I	ncome
Loss Ratio	~		Expenses		Expenses	F	PMPM	% Reven	ue		Infusions	F	PMPM	% Revenue
50.00%	~	\$	272.31	\$	38.78	\$	20.56	6.1	7%	\$	-	\$	20.56	6.17%
	~			•		•				-		•	'	
78.90%	~	\$	272.31	\$	38.78	\$	20.56	6.1	7%	\$	-	\$	20.56	6.17%
79.00%	~	\$	272.31	\$	38.78	\$	20.56	6.1	7%	\$	_	\$	20.56	6.17%
79.10%	~	<b>_</b> \$	272.31	\$	38.78	\$	20.56	6.1	7%	\$	-	\$	20.56	6.17%
	~	•				•				-		•		
91.60%	~	\$	305.32	\$	38.78	\$	(12.45)	<b>-</b> 3.7	3%	\$	(1.79)	\$	(14.24)	-4.27%
91.70%	~	\$	305.65	\$	38.78	\$	(12.78)	-3.8	3%	\$	(1.84)	\$	(14.62)	-4.39%
91.80%	~	\$	305.98	\$	38.78	\$	(13.11)	-3.9	3%	\$	(1.89)	\$	(15.00)	-4.50%
150.00%	~	\$	499.98	\$	38.78	\$	(207.10)	-62.1	3%	\$	(29.83)	\$	(236.94)	-71.09%
			Sumn	nariz	zed Capped Exp	pei	rience				Capital Infus	sio	n and N	et Income

### **UWG Model**





#### **User Inputs**

COST OF CAPITAL INPUTS	
WACC Components	
Risk Free Rate	2.8%
Market Expected Return	13.2%
Beta	0.940
Cost of Debt (Borrowing Rate)	5.0%
Capital Structure	
Debt % of Total	20%
Equity % of Total	80%
Tax Rate	
Federal	21.0%
State	5.0%
RBC/Equity Ratio - average held by MCOs*	0.121
Minimum RBC/Equity Ratio**	0.100
200% RBC/Equity Ratio***	0.070

RISK MARGIN INPUTS		
Capitation Rate Components		
MCO Member Months	6,	989,448
Claims Expense PMPM	\$	285.54
Admin Expense PMPM	\$	31.28
Premium Tax		2.25%
Withhold		
Withhold - Percentage of Revenue at Risk		2.0%
Expected Recoupment		75.0%
Remittance and Risk Sharing		
MLR Net of Prem Tax   ✓		
Minimum MLR ✓		85.0%
Maximum MLR		95.0%
QI Allowance (PMPM)	\$	4.63
Net Income Model		
Expected Net Income (Before Tax)		2.00%
Number of Samples		1000



<sup>\*\*\*</sup> NAIC minimum RBC is 200%



<sup>\*</sup> Note: 100% of RBC/Equity is ~3.5% - 4.0% of revenue (factor of 0.035-0.04)

<sup>\*\*</sup> State Regulatory Agency Minimum RBC or equivalent

### **Cost of Capital Development**

#### **COST OF CAPITAL**

Equity Risk Premium		
Market Expected Return		13.2%
Risk Free Rate	-	2.8%
Equity Risk Premium	=	10.4%

Tax Rate	
Federal Tax Rate	21.0%
State Tax Rate	5.0%
Total Tax Rate	25.0%

Cost of Equity											
Equity Risk Premium		10.4%									
Beta	Χ	0.94									
Risk Free Rate	_ +	2.8%									
After Tax Cost of Equity	=	12.6%									
After Tax Yield (1 - Tax Rate)	÷	<u>75.1%</u>									
Cost of Equity (Before Tax)		16.8%									

Weighted Average											
Cost of Capital (WACC)											
		Weight		Rate							
Cost of Equity		80%	Χ	16.8%							
Cost of Debt	+	20%	Х	5.0%							
WACC	=			14.4%							

Capitation Rate Compone	ent	
Required Capital : Prem Ratio		0.121
WACC	Х	<u>14.4%</u>
UW Gain: Cost of Capital		1.74%



## Risk Margin Development

CAPITATION RATE COMPONENT	
UW Gain: Margin for Risk and Contingency	0.90%
UW Gain: Cost of Capital Infusions	0.06%

RATE DEVELOPMENT INPUTS								
PMPM	% of Premium							
\$ 6.67	2.00%							
\$ 333.32 (1.67) (285.54) (31.28) (7.50)	-0.50% -85.67% -9.38% -2.25%							
	PMPM \$ 6.67 \$ 333.32 (1.67) (285.54) (31.28)							

KEY STATISTIC SUMMARY						
Net Income Drivers	Р	МРМ	% of Premium			
Gain / (Loss)	\$	6.87	2.06%			
Cost of Capital Infusions		(0.20)	-0.06%			
Realized Net Income (Before Tax)	\$	6.67	2.00%			
MLR Min/Max Statistics	Во	undary	Probability			
Minimum MLR		85.0%	9.20%			
Maximum MLR		N/A	-			

										AV	ERAGE OF	SCENARIOS		
	Remittance MLR Formula													
Claims	Claims	Initial Net Income				MLR Defined				МСО	Capped	Transfe	er Payment	
Loss Ratio	Expenses	PMPM	Percent	Probability	QI Ex	penses	Nu	merato	De	nominator	MLR	Loss Ratio	Expense /	(Recievable)
85.67%	\$ 285.54	\$ 7.33	2.20%	100.00%	\$	4.63	\$	290.17	\$	325.82	89.06%	89.20%	\$	0.46

SCENARIO	JE MODELE	UNIQL			Formula	ΙD	ttanco M	mi	D/			rionco	/ICO Expe	Initial I	
Payment	Transfor	apped	ICO				MLR	<b>;</b> [[]]	- Ne	_			Initial Net		Claims
rayillelli Recievable)				_	nominator	_		Nu	Expenses	QI	Probability		PMPM	Expenses	
105.66			2.57%		325.82	\$	171.29	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	37.9%	\$ 126.21	\$ 166.66	
105.32	\$	85.00%	2.67%	2 5	325.82	\$	171.62	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	37.8%	\$ 125.88	\$ 166.99	50.10%
104.99	\$	85.00%	2.78%	2 5	325.82	\$	171.96	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	37.7%	\$ 125.55	\$ 167.33	50.20%
104.66	\$	85.00%	2.88%	2 5	325.82	\$	172.29	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	37.6%	\$ 125.21	\$ 167.66	50.30%
104.32	\$	85.00%	2.98%	2 5	325.82	\$	172.62	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	37.5%	\$ 124.88	\$ 167.99	50.40%
103.99	\$	85.00%	3.08%	2 5	325.82	\$	172.96	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	37.4%	\$ 124.55	\$ 168.33	50.50%
103.66	\$	85.00%	3.19%	2 5	325.82	\$	173.29	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	37.3%	\$ 124.21	\$ 168.66	50.60%
103.32	\$	85.00%	3.29%	2 5	325.82	\$	173.62	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	37.2%	\$ 123.88	\$ 168.99	50.70%
102.99	\$	85.00%	3.39%		325.82	\$	173.95	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	37.1%	\$ 123.55	\$ 169.32	50.80%
102.66	\$	85.00%	3.49%	2 5	325.82	\$	174.29	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	37.0%	\$ 123.21	\$ 169.66	50.90%
102.32	\$	85.00%	3.59%	2 5	325.82	\$	174.62	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	36.9%	\$ 122.88	\$ 169.99	51.00%
101.99	\$	85.00%	3.70%	2 5	325.82	\$	174.95	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	36.8%	\$ 122.55	\$ 170.32	51.10%
101.66	\$	85.00%	3.80%	2 5	325.82	\$	175.29	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	36.7%	\$ 122.21	\$ 170.66	51.20%
101.12				2 /	325.82	\$	175.62	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	36.6%	\$ 121.88	\$ 170.99	51.30%
100	م/	Tabl		2	325.82	\$	175.95	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	36.5%	\$ 121.55	\$ 171.32	51.40%
		IUDI		2	325.82	\$	176.29	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	36.4%	\$ 121.21	\$ 171.66	51.50%
100.	ues	ntin	C	2	325.82	\$	176.62	\$	4.63	\$	0.00%	36.3%	\$ 120.88	\$ 171.99	51.60%



## **Model Summary**

UW Gain (rate component) of 2.70% produces Expected Net Income (Before Tax) of 2.00%

UNDERWRITING (UW) GAIN	
Cost of Capital: Initial Investment	1.74%
Cost of Capital Infusions	0.06%
Margin for Risk & Contingency	0.90%
UW Gain	2.70%

EXPECTED PRE-TAX NET INCO	ME
UW Gain (Rate Component)	2.70%
Less Withhold Not Achieved	-0.50%
Less Capital Infusions	-0.06%
Less MLR Cap(s)	-0.14%
Expected Net Income (Before Tax)	2.00%

#### STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Gain Interval	Probability
0 - 2%	24.2%
2 - 4%	25.2%
4 - 6%	16.9%
6 - 8%	10.3%
8 - 10%	0.0%
10+%	0.0%
Probability of Gain	76.6%
Expected Gain   Given Gain	3.2%

Loss Interval	Probability
0 - 2%	14.0%
2 - 4%	6.3%
4 - 6%	2.4%
6 - 8%	0.6%
8 - 10%	0.1%
10+%	0.0%
Probability of Loss	23.4%
Expected Loss   Given Loss	-2.0%

Ruin Loss Indicators	Probability
RBC/Equity reduced below min required	8.85%
RBC/Equity reduced below 200%	1.48%
Total Loss of RBC/Equity	0.00%

#### MCO FINANCIAL SUMMARIES

Income Summary		PMPM	Dollars	% of Revenue	
Average MCO Member Months			6,989,448		
Revenue					
Total Capitation	\$	333.32	\$ 2,329,700,726	100.00%	
Less Withhold not Achieved	\$	(1.67)	\$ (11,648,504)	-0.50%	
Expected MLR Rebate/(Payment)	\$	(0.46)	\$ (3,246,617)	<u>-0.14%</u>	
Net Revenue	\$	331.19	\$ 2,314,805,606	99.36%	
Expenses					
Claims	\$	285.54	\$ 1,995,766,982	85.67%	
Admin	\$	31.28	\$ 218,629,933	9.38%	
Premium Tax	\$	7.50	\$ 52,418,266	2.25%	
Expected Capital Infusions	\$	0.20	\$ 1,396,410	0.06%	
Total Expenses	\$	324.52	\$ 2,268,211,591	97.36%	
Expected Net Income (Before Tax)	\$	6.67	\$ 46,594,014	2.00%	

Cost of Capital Summary	PMPM	Dollars	% of Revenue
Required Capital	\$ 40.33	\$ 281,893,788	12.10%
Annual Cost of Capital (After Tax)	\$ 4.36	\$ 30,476,600	1.31%
Tax Rate			
Federal Tax Rate	21.0%		
State Tax Rate	5.0%		
Total Tax Rate	25.0%		
Annual Cost of Capital (Before Tax)	\$ 5.81	\$ 40,608,394	1.74%



#### **Model Summary**

UW Gain (rate component) of 2.70% produces Expected Net Income (Before Tax) of 2.00%

UNDERWRITING (UW) GAIN		
Cost of Capital: Initial Investment	1.74%	
Cost of Capital Infusions	0.06%	
Margin for Risk & Contingency	0.90%	
UW Gain	2.70%	

EXPECTED PRE-TAX NET INCOME		
UW Gain (Rate Component)	2.70%	
Less Withhold Not Achieved	-0.50%	
Less Capital Infusions	-0.06%	
Less MLR Cap(s)	-0.14%	
Expected Net Income (Before Tax)	2.00%	

Revise Target

#### STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Gain Interval	Probability
0 - 2%	24.2%
2 - 4%	25.2%
4 - 6%	16.9%
6 - 8%	10.3%
8 - 10%	0.0%
10+%	0.0%
Probability of Gain	76.6%
Expected Gain   Given Gain	3.2%

Loss Interval	Probability
0 - 2%	14.0%
2 - 4%	6.3%
4 - 6%	2.4%
6 - 8%	0.6%
8 - 10%	0.1%
10+%	0.0%
Probability of Loss	23.4%
Expected Loss   Given Loss	-2.0%

Ruin Loss Indicators	Probability
RBC/Equity reduced below min required	8.85%
RBC/Equity reduced below 200%	1.48%
Total Loss of RBC/Equity	0.00%

Actuarial
Judgement:
Probability of
Loss < 20%



#### User Inputs - Revised

COST OF CAPITAL INPUTS	
WACC Components	
Risk Free Rate	2.8%
Market Expected Return	13.2%
Beta	0.940
Cost of Debt (Borrowing Rate)	5.0%
Capital Structure	
Debt % of Total	20%
Equity % of Total	80%
Tax Rate	
Federal	21.0%
State	5.0%
RBC/Equity Ratio - average held by MCOs*	0.121
Minimum RBC/Equity Ratio**	0.100
200% RBC/Equity Ratio***	0.070

RISK MARGIN INPUTS		
Capitation Rate Components		
MCO Member Months	6,	989,448
Claims Expense PMPM	\$	285.54
Admin Expense PMPM	\$	31.28
Premium Tax		2.25%
Withhold		
Withhold - Percentage of Revenue at Risk		2.0%
Expected Recoupment		75.0%
Remittance and Risk Sharing		
MLR Net of Prem Tax		
Minimum MLR		85.0%
Maximum MLR		95.0%
QI Allowance (PMPM)	\$	4.63
Net Income Model		
Expected Net Income (Before Tax)		2.35%
Number of Samples		1000

Calculate UW Gain

New Target = 2.35%

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> NAIC minimum RBC is 200%



<sup>\*</sup> Note: 100% of RBC/Equity is ~3.5% - 4.0% of revenue (factor of 0.035-0.04)

<sup>\*\*</sup> State Regulatory Agency Minimum RBC or equivalent

#### Model Summary - Revised

UW Gain (rate component) of 3.07% produces Expected Net Income (Before Tax) of 2.35%.

UNDERWRITING (UW) GAIN	
Cost of Capital: Initial Investment	1.74%
Cost of Capital Infusions	0.05%
Margin for Risk & Contingency	1.28%
UW Gain	3.07%

EXPECTED PRE-TAX NET INCOME	
UW Gain (Rate Component)	3.07%
Less Withhold Not Achieved	-0.50%
Less Capital Infusions	-0.05%
Less MLR Cap(s)	-0.18%
Expected Net Income (Before Tax)	2.35%

#### STATISTICAL SUMMARY

Gain Interval	Probability
0 - 2%	22.6%
2 - 4%	25.9%
4 - 6%	19.2%
6 - 8%	13.1%
8 - 10%	0.0%
10+%	0.0%
Probability of Gain	80.8%
Expected Gain   Given Gain	3.4%

Loss Interval	Probability
0 - 2%	11.5%
2 - 4%	5.2%
4 - 6%	1.9%
6 - 8%	0.5%
8 - 10%	0.1%
10+%	0.0%
Probability of Loss	19.2%
Expected Loss   Given Loss	-2.0%

Ruin Loss Indicators	Probability
RBC/Equity reduced below min required	7.22%
RBC/Equity reduced below 200%	1.13%
Total Loss of RBC/Equity	0.00%



Probability of Loss = 19.2%



# Questions





# Closing





