



## 56 - Avoiding Statistical Pitfalls in Actuarial Work

[SOA Antitrust Disclaimer](#)

[SOA Presentation Disclaimer](#)

# TS 56: *Avoiding Statistical Pitfalls in Actuarial Work*

---

**Douglas L. Robbins**

**August 27, 2019**



# Topics

---

- Tail Scenarios and “Sensitivity Dependency”
- CTE 98 Challenges
- Use and Misuse of Linear Regression

# Topics

---

- Tail Scenarios and “Sensitivity Dependency”

# Sensitivity Testing in General

---

- For any Risk Factor, in whatever situation
  - You may want to examine the impact of stressing that assumption on your CTE, or other, testing results
  - You may have an idea of what “moderately adverse” all the way to “worst case” looks like for that assumption
  - You may think that this gives you a feel for the impact on Reserves and/or Capital, if that assumption goes south
- Your technique may be very statistical – which is both the good news and the bad . . . .

# Something to Consider . . . .

---

- It's not necessarily true (or even likely) that your risks are independent, so how do you combine your various risk factors?
  - Some risk factors, like economy and lapse, may be “prima facie *dependent*”
  - Others, like lapse and basic expenses might seem to be independent, but in the end not be
- A couple simple examples to try to make my meaning clear:



# The Ice Cream / Oreo Paradox

---

- Consider a proposed relationship between outside temperature, and how much ice cream you want (Sm, Md, Lg)
  - I would claim this is “prima facie dependent”
  - The hotter it is, the more ice cream you want!
- But . . . what if you are considering your desire for ice cream, alongside your desire for Oreo cookies? Independent?
- Let’s assume so; but what if . . . .

# What If . . . .

---

- . . . . you know your spouse will kill you if you eat a whole carton & a whole box, in one day?
- How effectively will you analyze the “Risk Margin of your death” if you only hold one “snack” at “Medium” and stress the other?
- You won't – you will die!
- Moral: Two independent events can become dependent in terms of tail risk
- Examining sensitivities in tandem may be wise,





# Topics

---

□ CTE 98 Challenges

# Imminent Changes for Variable Annuities

---

- You've probably heard about many of them throughout this meeting

# Imminent Changes for Variable Annuities

---

- You've probably heard about many of them throughout this meeting
- The key one I will focus on here is the use of CTE 98 for VA C-3, as opposed to a related derivative of CTE 90

# Imminent Changes for Variable Annuities

---

- You've probably heard about many of them throughout this meeting
- The key one I will focus on here is the use of CTE 98 for VA C-3, as opposed to a related derivative of CTE 90
- The first difference between the two that may occur to you is sample size – for a given # of overall scenarios, this will pick up 1/5 as many tail scenarios – is that ok?

# Imminent Changes for Variable Annuities

---

- You've probably heard about many of them throughout this meeting
- The key one I will focus on here is the use of CTE 98 for VA C-3, as opposed to a related derivative of CTE 90
- The first difference between the two that may occur to you is sample size – for a given # of overall scenarios, this will pick up 1/5 as many tail scenarios – is that ok? What sample size are we taught is “enough”?

# The E-Lottery

---

- I'm going to continue this segment by telling you about an online lottery I've always wanted to form

# The E-Lottery

---

- I'm going to continue this segment by telling you about an online lottery I've always wanted to form
- After I explain why, you'll think I'm even more of a geek – that's ok!



# The E-Lottery

---

- I'm going to continue this segment by telling you about an online lottery I've always wanted to form
- After I explain why, you'll think I'm even more of a geek – that's ok!
- In this lottery, I find a large number ("N") of players, who give me \$1 each





# The E-Lottery

---

- I'm going to continue this segment by telling you about an online lottery I've always wanted to form
- After I explain why, you'll think I'm even more of a geek – that's ok!
- In this lottery, I find a large number ("N") of players, who give me \$1 each
- Each picks a number between 1 and N, and I eventually will randomly select a ball from a basket with balls marked with 1 -> N



# The E-Lottery

---

- The players all make their own choices, and cannot collaborate (so “independent”)
- If one player alone picks the right number, they win the entire pot of  $\$N$
- If multiple players win, they split  $\$N$  evenly
- If no one picks the right number, I keep it all
- What are the odds that I keep it all?

# The E-Lottery

---

- In fact, each player has a  $1/N$  chance of hitting the right number
- If there's at least one winner, I lose (unless it's a buddy!) – I get nothing
- So what I want is  $(1 - 1/N)^N$

# The E-Lottery

---

- In fact, each player has a  $1/N$  chance of hitting the right number
- If there's at least one winner, I lose (unless it's a buddy!) – I get nothing
- So what I want is  $(1 - 1/N)^N$  as  $N \rightarrow \text{infinity}$ !

# The E-Lottery

---

- In fact, each player has a  $1/N$  chance of hitting the right number
- If there's at least one winner, I lose (unless it's a buddy!) – I get nothing
- So what I want is  $(1 - 1/N)^N$  as  $N \rightarrow \text{infinity}$ !
- Anyone recognize that formula?

# The E-Lottery

---

- In fact, each player has a  $1/N$  chance of hitting the right number
- If there's at least one winner, I lose (unless it's a buddy!) – I get nothing
- So what I want is  $(1 - 1/N)^N$  as  $N \rightarrow \text{infinity}$ !
- Anyone recognize that formula?
- That's right!! The answer is  $1/e$ !!

# The E-Lottery

---

- In fact, each player has a  $1/N$  chance of hitting the right number
- If there's at least one winner, I lose (unless it's a buddy!) – I get nothing
- So what I want is  $(1 - 1/N)^N$  as  $N \rightarrow \text{infinity}$ !
- Anyone recognize that formula?
- That's right!! The answer is  $1/e$ !!
- Was I right about the “geek” thing?

## WHAT did we just spend all that time on?

---

- This concept actually matters, as it makes us a bit more intuitive about tail samples of highly-skewed distributions
- If I run 100 scenarios, for instance, what are my odds that none of them exceed the 99<sup>th</sup> %-ile worst true result?
- Very close to  $1/e$ , which is A LOT, in terms of a statistical risk!!



## You'd never do this, but as a thought exercise:

---

- What if I ran 100 scenarios to do my VACARVM and C-3, II studies?
- Under a CTE 90 regime, is that  $1/e$  result important? Sure, somewhat
- But how about a CTE 98 regime?
  - I'm basically going to look at 2 scenarios, and I'm only about  $\{1-1/e\}$  confident that at least one of them is greater than the true 99<sup>th</sup> percentile (CTE's mid-point)!!
  - It should be apparent that this estimator is badly biased downward—a deeply unconservative outcome

## Downward bias is a “thing” with any CTE

---

- Another way to make this intuitively obvious is to consider the nature of the “worst result”
- It is always your most-biased estimate of any %-ile in your study

## Downward bias is a “thing” with any CTE

---

- Another way to make this intuitively obvious is to consider the nature of the “worst result”
- It is always your most-biased estimate of any %-ile in your study
  - Each new observation you record can only do 1 of 2 things

## Downward bias is a “thing” with any CTE

---

- Another way to make this intuitively obvious is to consider the nature of the “worst result”
- It is always your most-biased estimate of any %-ile in your study
  - Each new observation you record can only do 1 of 2 things
  - Either your previous worst-case stays the same, or the new observation makes your estimate even worse

# Downward bias is a “thing” with any CTE

---

- Another way to make this intuitively obvious is to consider the nature of the “worst result”
- It is always your most-biased estimate of any %-ile in your study
  - Each new observation you record can only do 1 of 2 things
  - Either your previous worst-case stays the same, or the new observation makes your estimate even worse
  - This effect ripples through your entire set of CTE observations, although it quickly becomes less material

## Downward bias is a “thing” with any CTE

---

- Another way to make this intuitively obvious is to consider the nature of the “worst result”
- It is always your most-biased estimate of any %-ile in your study
  - Each new observation you record can only do 1 of 2 things
  - Either your previous worst-case stays the same, or the new observation makes your estimate even worse
  - This effect ripples through your entire set of CTE observations, although it quickly becomes less material
- Still, you can see even with 1,000 scenarios, the jump from CTE 90 to 98 is a big deal

## How Big a Deal is it?

---

- Without knowing your loss distribution, I can't be precise
- However, I'd guess most capital runs produce many  $PV(\text{losses}) = \$0$ , followed by a set of rapidly escalating positives
- Plausibly more or less Exponential
- Let's assume that, and see what happens . . . .


## How Big a Deal is it?

---

- I'm going to steal a parameter estimate from a VA WB study I did recently
  - Total Premium around \$8.7 million
  - Mean and Std Dev around \$40k, so we'll use that for the Exponential lambda
- Now a WB loss distribution is actually bounded (at least if mortality  $\rightarrow 1.000$ )
- So my real distribution is probably less skewed than Exponential, but if we assume Exp, we can talk "true parameter values"



# How Big a Deal is it?



## A few key facts about EXP(\$40k) and CTE98

---

- My true 98<sup>th</sup> percentile is about \$157k
  - $P(981^{\text{st}} \text{ ranked scenario} \geq 98^{\text{th}} \text{ \% -ile}) = ?$

## A few key facts about EXP(\$40k) and CTE98

---

- My true 98<sup>th</sup> percentile is about \$157k
  - $P(981^{\text{st}} \text{ ranked scenario} \geq 98^{\text{th}} \text{ \% -ile}) = ?$
  - It's only about 62%

## A few key facts about EXP(\$40k) and CTE98

---

- My true 98<sup>th</sup> percentile is about \$157k
  - $P(981^{\text{st}} \text{ ranked scenario} \geq 98^{\text{th}} \text{ \% -ile}) = ?$
  - It's only about 62%
- My true 99.9<sup>th</sup> %-ile is about \$276k

## A few key facts about EXP(\$40k) and CTE98

---

- My true 98<sup>th</sup> percentile is about \$157k
  - $P(981^{\text{st}} \text{ ranked scenario} \geq 98^{\text{th}} \text{ \% -ile}) = ?$
  - It's only about 62%
- My true 99.9<sup>th</sup> %-ile is about \$276k
  - $P(1,000^{\text{th}} \text{ ranked scenario} \geq 99.9^{\text{th}} \text{ \% -ile}) = ?$

## A few key facts about EXP(\$40k) and CTE98

---

- My true 98<sup>th</sup> percentile is about \$157k
  - $P(981^{\text{st}} \text{ ranked scenario} \geq 98^{\text{th}} \text{ \% -ile}) = ?$
  - It's only about 62%
- My true 99.9<sup>th</sup> %-ile is about \$276k
  - $P(1,000^{\text{th}} \text{ ranked scenario} \geq 99.9^{\text{th}} \text{ \% -ile}) = ?$
  - Hint: You should know this one!

# A few key facts about EXP(\$40k) and CTE98

---

□ My true 98<sup>th</sup> percentile is about \$157k

□  $P(981^{\text{st}}$  ranked scenario  $\geq$  98<sup>th</sup> %-ile) = ?

□ It's only about 62%

□ My true 99.9<sup>th</sup> %-ile is about \$40k

□  $P(1,000^{\text{th}}$  ranked scenario  $\geq$  99.9<sup>th</sup> %-ile) = ?

□ Hint: You should know this one!



## A few key facts about EXP(\$40k) and CTE98

---

□ My true 98<sup>th</sup> percentile is about \$157k

□  $P(981^{\text{st}}$  ranked scenario  $\geq$  98<sup>th</sup> %-ile) = ?

□ It's only about 62%

□ My true 99.9<sup>th</sup> %-ile is about \$276k

□  $P(1,000^{\text{th}}$  ranked scenario  $\geq$  99.9<sup>th</sup> %-ile) = ?

□ Hint: You should know this one!

□ Yes, that's right! It's  $1 - 1/e$ , or about 63%



## A few key facts about EXP(\$40k) and CTE98

---

- My true 98<sup>th</sup> percentile is about \$157k
  - $P(981^{\text{st}}$  ranked scenario  $\geq$  98<sup>th</sup> %-ile) = ?
  - It's only about 62%
- My true 99.9<sup>th</sup> %-ile is about \$276k
  - $P(1,000^{\text{th}}$  ranked scenario  $\geq$  99.9<sup>th</sup> %-ile) = ?
  - Hint: You should know this one!
  - Yes, that's right! It's  $1 - 1/e$ , or about 63%
- The two are probably correlated due to a sort of accordion/spring effect (if you think about it); leading us to . . .


## A few key facts about EXP(\$40k) and CTE98

---

- The difference between a CTE 98 that runs evenly from 98<sup>th</sup> to 99.9<sup>th</sup> percentiles over 20 tail scenarios, and one that runs from 97.9<sup>th</sup> to 99.8<sup>th</sup>, is about \$6k
- The std error of the CTE98 is about \$10k
- That means the bias is quite relevant
- But even that fails to account for the fact that a CTE98 should run from the 98<sup>th</sup> to the 100<sup>th</sup> percentile (not the 99.9<sup>th</sup>)

# A few key facts about EXP(\$40k) and CTE98

- I actually deleted something from the chart I showed you before; the real chart is:



## A few key facts about EXP(\$40k) and CTE98

---

- The “true” value for the 100<sup>th</sup> percentile is of course, infinity – can’t do much with that
- But if we consider the 98<sup>th</sup> through the 99.99<sup>th</sup> percentile range as our true CTE, the potential bias in our estimate is more like \$15k, which is around {std error X 150%}
- This is likely unacceptable
- If we run 10,000 scenarios, chances are the bias (not to mention the std error) will be small enough to safely ignore

# Bottom Line Lesson

---

- When working out a CTE98 . . .

# Bottom Line Lesson

---

- When working out a CTE98 . . .
- . . . just always err on the side of using MORE SCENARIOS

# Bottom Line Lesson

---

□ When working out a CTE98 . . .

□ . . . just always err on the side of using MORE SCENARIOS



# Bottom Line Lesson

---

□ When working out a CTE98 . . .

□ . . . just always err on the side of using MORE SCENARIOS



□ Or perhaps . . . just perhaps . . . consider using a scenario selection algorithm so you only end up running the tail ones from a hypothetical “large enough” set



# Topics

---

- Use and Misuse of Linear Regression

# Why do we do Multiple Linear Regressions?

---

- We want as accurate a predictor of a future outcome as we can get from our data set
- We instinctively feel that the more data we can harness, the better
  - Sometimes, this is the case—for a Balanced Fund mapping, you may need 3 Equity classes plus Bond
  - But sometimes

# Why do we do Multiple Linear Regressions?

---

- We want as accurate a predictor of a future outcome as we can get from our data set
- We instinctively feel that the more data we can harness, the better
  - Sometimes, this is the case—for a Balanced Fund mapping, you may need 3 Equity classes plus Bond
  - But sometimes . . . . . well

# Why do we do Multiple Linear Regressions?

---

- We want as accurate a predictor of a future outcome as we can get from our data set
- We instinctively feel that the more data we can harness, the better
  - Sometimes, this is the case—for a Balanced Fund mapping, you may need 3 Equity classes plus Bond
  - But sometimes . . . . . well . . . . . let's look at another Case Study!

# Linear Regression Case Study

---

- An actuary who is nearing retirement has attended Val Act for years and years
- He's found that when he's away from home, he can't track his net worth daily, but he does have access to the S&P
- He has the data going back 9 years of his pre- and post- Val Act data, and wants to be able to predict his 2019 end-of-meeting net worth before going home

# Linear Regression Case Study

---

## □ Here is what he knows:

- His basket of stocks, currently worth \$100k, tracks at least somewhat with the S&P 500, but not perfectly
- He doesn't always like the Val Act food

## □ Here is what WE KNOW:

- His basket of stocks actually moves proportionately with the S&P, with an error that is Uniform(+/- 5%)
- If he eats the Val Act food, he spends nothing extra, but:
  - If he goes for a street hotdog, he'll spend  $U(\$5-\$10)$
  - If he goes out to "Sushi Max," he'll spend  $U(\$25-50)$

# Linear Regression Case Study

- Again, this actuary has 9 years of prior data; scaling the initial portfolio value each year to the current \$100k, the history is:

	S&P -10%	S&P Flat	S&P +10%
Meeting Meal	\$89,133	\$96,833	\$110,720
Hot Dog	\$91,736	\$104,641	\$107,137
Sushi Max	\$90,114	\$100,029	\$112,317

- This seems eminently “regressable” so the actuary goes to it! I mean, why not?

# Linear Regression Case Study

---

- The actuary, sensibly, first looks at S&P alone:
  - $X_1$ -data are -1  $\rightarrow$  -10%, 0, 1  $\rightarrow$  +10% (just to clarify)
  - The  $R^2$  is 96.1% and the p-value is  $4 * 10^{-5}$
  - The parameter on the S&P500 is \$9,865 with standard error \$1,075—so far, so good
- They then look at food ( $X_2$  data 0-2):
  - The  $R^2$  is 9.4% and the p-value is 81%—shocking, right?
  - The parameter on food is \$962 with standard error \$3,863—so the actual value is within the conf interval!
- The actuary, finally, looks at both in tandem:
- What do you think happened?



# Linear Regression Case Study

---

□ NOT WHAT I THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN!

# Linear Regression Case Study

---

- NOT WHAT I THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN!
- None of us probably had enough stats in school, and what we did store up leaks over time

# Linear Regression Case Study

---

- NOT WHAT I THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN!
- None of us probably had enough stats in school, and what we did store up leaks over time
- But the result makes total sense:

# Linear Regression Case Study

---

- NOT WHAT I THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN!
- None of us probably had enough stats in school, and what we did store up leaks over time
- But the result makes total sense:
  - The  $R^2$  went up to 96.5% (it will increase with each new variable you add, every time)

# Linear Regression Case Study

---

- NOT WHAT I THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN!
- None of us probably had enough stats in school, and what we did store up leaks over time
- But the result makes total sense:
  - The  $R^2$  went up to 96.5% (it will increase with each new variable you add, every time)
  - The overall F-statistic went up to 0.0003 (so worse than S&P only), with a p-value on S&P of 0.0001

# Linear Regression Case Study

---

- NOT WHAT I THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN!
- None of us probably had enough stats in school, and what we did store up leaks over time
- But the result makes total sense:
  - The  $R^2$  went up to 96.5% (it will increase with each new variable you add, every time)
  - The overall F-statistic went up to 0.0003 (so worse than S&P only), with a p-value on S&P of 0.0001
  - But . . . the parameter estimates did not change one iota

# Linear Regression Case Study

---

- NOT WHAT I THOUGHT WOULD HAPPEN!
- None of us probably had enough stats in school, and what we did store up leaks over time
- But the result makes total sense:
  - The  $R^2$  went up to 96.5% (it will increase with each new variable you add, every time)
  - The overall F-statistic went up to 0.0003 (so worse than S&P only), with a p-value on S&P of 0.0001
  - But . . . the parameter estimates did not change one iota
  - The reason is that the actuary has designed a perfectly independent set of experimental trials

# Lessons so Far

---

- Nothing too spectacular



# Lessons so Far

---

- Nothing too spectacular
- We all know the probability of a false positive is important

# Lessons so Far

---

- Nothing too spectacular
- We all know the probability of a false positive is important, and we quantify it—what about a false negative?

# Lessons so Far

---

- Nothing too spectacular
- We all know the probability of a false positive is important, and we quantify it—what about a false negative?
- Often we have no clue what that probability is

# Lessons so Far

---

- Nothing too spectacular
- We all know the probability of a false positive is important, and we quantify it—what about a false negative?
- Often we have no clue what that probability is
- One time it's big is when a variable's range is dwarfed by a regression's overall error

# What if the Actuary is more like Us?

---

- On a down market day, they would never go for sushi? And on an up market day, they would never eat Val Act food?
- We go from this old data set:

	S&P -10%	S&P Flat	S&P +10%
Meeting Meal	\$89,133	\$96,833	\$110,720
Hot Dog	\$91,736	\$104,641	\$107,137
Sushi Max	\$90,114	\$100,029	\$112,317

# What if the Actuary is more like Us?

- On a down market day, they would never go for sushi? And on an up market day, they would never eat Val Act food?
- To this new data set (same random #s):

	S&P -10%	S&P Flat	S&P +10%
Meeting Meal	\$89,133	\$96,833	\$110,713
Hot Dog	\$91,736	\$104,641	\$107,137
	\$90,147		
Sushi Max		\$100,029	\$112,317

# What if the Actuary is more like Us?

- On a down market day, they would never go for sushi? And on an up market day, they would never eat Val Act food?\*

	S&P -10%	S&P Flat	S&P +10%
Meeting Meal	\$89,133	\$96,833	\$110,713
Hot Dog	\$91,736	\$104,641	\$107,137
Sushi Max	\$90,147	\$100,029	\$112,317

- We repeat the regression

\*Same random numbers used

# What do you think happened now?

---

- The S&P-only regression, of course, changed by an immaterial amount



# What do you think happened now?

---

- The S&P-only regression, of course, changed by an immaterial amount
- But the parameter estimate on food-only was now over \$6,500—hmhhhmm.....

# What do you think happened now?

---

- The S&P-only regression, of course, changed by an immaterial amount
- But the parameter estimate on food-only was now over \$6,500—hmmmm.....
- In a joint regression, the parameter on the S&P500 worsened to \$9,192 with a not much changed confidence interval; the food estimate was right at \$2,000

# Let's go Whole Hog on this!

---

- This actuary would in fact never spend a dime on food, during a down market
- They'd only go for sushi to celebrate an up market day (and in that case, they would do so  $2/3$  of the time)
- Now, what do you think will happen?

# Old (2<sup>nd</sup> set) Data

---

		S&P -10%		S&P Flat		S&P +10%
Meeting Meal		\$89,133		\$96,833		
						\$110,713
Hot Dog		\$91,736		\$104,641		\$107,137
		\$90,147				
Sushi Max				\$100,029		\$112,317

# Newest Data

---

		S&P -10%		S&P Flat		S&P +10%
Meeting Meal		\$89,133		\$96,833		
		\$91,746				
		\$90,155				\$110,713
Hot Dog				\$104,641		
				\$100,063		\$107,108
Sushi Max						\$112,317

# Let's go Whole Hog on this!

---

- The S&P-only regression remains solid

# Let's go Whole Hog on this!

---

- The S&P-only regression remains solid
- The parameter on food is nearly \$10,000

# Let's go Whole Hog on this!

---

- The S&P-only regression remains solid
- The parameter on food is nearly \$10,000
  - Does that surprise you?



# Let's go Whole Hog on this!

---

- The S&P-only regression remains solid
- The parameter on food is nearly \$10,000
  - Does that surprise you?
  - Should it? Who can guess the  $R^2$  of food??

# Let's go Whole Hog on this!

---

- The S&P-only regression remains solid
- The parameter on food is nearly \$10,000
  - Does that surprise you?
  - Should it? Who can guess the  $R^2$  of food?? It's 88%!!

# Let's go Whole Hog on this!

---

- The S&P-only regression remains solid
- The parameter on food is nearly \$10,000
  - Does that surprise you?
  - Should it? Who can guess the  $R^2$  of food?? It's 88%!!
- In the joint regression, the parameter on the S&P is ~\$8,100 and on Food, it is ~\$2,100—what strikes you about that?
  - A “significant” relationship (S&P p-level still <1%)
  - A more or less USELESS predictor for the future—WHY??
  - That is the magic of co-linearity, brought to life

# Let Me Ask One More Thing

---

Is the actuary in our example:

# Let Me Ask One More Thing

---

Is the actuary in our example:

□ This guy??



(Ebenezer Scrooge)

# Let Me Ask One More Thing

---

Is the actuary in our example:

□ This guy??



(Ebenezer Scrooge)

□ Or this one??



(Melvin from  
“As Good  
as It Gets”)

# Let Me Ask One More Thing

---

Is the actuary in our example:

□ This guy??



(Ebenezer Scrooge)

□ Or this one??



(Melvin from  
“As Good  
as It Gets”)

<<Kudos to Jack, btw!!>>

# Let Me Ask One More Thing

---

Is the actuary in our example:

□ This guy??



(Ebenezer Scrooge)

□ Or this one??



(Melvin from  
“As Good  
as It Gets”)

<<Kudos to Jack, btw!!>>



# Let Me Ask One More Thing

---

Is the actuary in our example:

□ This guy??



(Ebenezer Scrooge)

□ Or this one??



(Melvin from  
“As Good  
as It Gets”)

‘Cause it must be Greed or OCD at work here!!

# Let Me Ask One More Thing

---

Is the actuary in our example:

□ This guy??



(Ebenezer Scrooge)

□ Or this one??



(Melvin from  
“As Good  
as It Gets”)

‘Cause it must be Greed or OCD at work here!! For an actuary, likely the latter

# Bottom Line Lessons

---

- It is probably a waste of time, and only possibly a harmless one, to add regression variables that could be significant, but nevertheless immaterial:
  - Harmless iff the variable added is “independent” of others used
  - The problem is that sometimes you don’t know, and what you don’t know can and will hurt you! Immaterial variables can still be very harmful if included
  - We must resist the temptation to “use it because we can”

# Bottom Line Lessons

---

- It is probably a waste of time, and only possibly a harmless one, to add regression variables that could be significant, but nevertheless immaterial:
  - Harmless iff the variable added is “independent” of others used
  - The problem is that sometimes you don’t know, and what you don’t know can and will hurt you! Immaterial variables can still be very harmful if included
  - We must resist the temptation to “use it because we can”
- “But adding it increases my  $R^2$ ” isn’t even a ghost of an argument for including a variable

# Bottom Line Lessons

---

- It is probably a waste of time, and only possibly a harmless one, to add regression variables that could be significant, but nevertheless immaterial:
  - Harmless iff the variable added is “independent” of others used
  - The problem is that sometimes you don’t know, and what you don’t know can and will hurt you! Immaterial variables can still be very harmful if included
  - We must resist the temptation to “use it because we can”
- “But adding it increases my  $R^2$ ” isn’t even a ghost of an argument for including a variable
- Possible Application: Including “Cash” in a fund-mapping exercise

# AVOIDING STATISTICAL PITFALLS IN ACTUARIAL WORK

AUGUST 27, 2019

Mark Spong, FSA, CERA, MAAA  
Senior Consultant

# A few pitfalls and how to avoid them

1



Simulating interest rate stress scenarios

2



Applying credibility

3




Understanding the impacts of mix of business

# 1 | Simulating interest rate stress scenarios




# Historical interest rates are not random

## Trigger events drive interest rates to new regimes



Source: 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate


# Interest rate regimes capture changes to a “new normal”



Source: 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate


# Stress scenarios are not predictions

## They inform what happens under a range of possibilities



Source: 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate


# Historically calibrated simulations produce a cone of uncertainty Actual interest rate movements appear more volatile than expected



Source: 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate

# Stress scenarios are not predictions


## They inform what happens under a range of possibilities



Source: 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate

# Actual interest rate movement still appears extreme

## The simulations are missing the regime-switching feature which leads to underestimating volatility



Source: 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate

## 2 | Applying credibility

Credibility parameters are subjectively chosen  
 The choice of confidence level ( $p$ ) and margin of error ( $r$ ) are prone to anchor bias and not selected with a theoretical foundation



### Number of deaths needed for full credibility based on $r$ and $p$ (counts)

	$r = 1\%$	$r = 3\%$	$r = 5\%$
$p = 90\%$ ( $z = 1.65$ )	27,060	3,007	1,082
$p = 95\%$ ( $z = 1.96$ )	38,416	4,268	1,573
$p = 99\%$ ( $z = 2.58$ )	66,306	7,367	2,652

### Credibility for 1,082 deaths

	$r = 1\%$	$r = 3\%$	$r = 5\%$
$p = 90\%$ ( $z = 1.645$ )	20%	60%	100%
$p = 95\%$ ( $z = 1.96$ )	17%	50%	83%
$p = 99\%$ ( $z = 2.575$ )	13%	38%	64%

Source: SOA Credibility Education Resource for Pension Actuaries August 2017



# Credibility is affected by subjective grouping

## Subgroups may be partially credible while the total may be fully credible



### Mortality study illustration

	Actual	Expected	A/E	Credibility
Male	700	665	105%	80%
Female	400	436	92%	61%
Total	1,100	1,101	100%	100%

*The whole dataset is fully credible; therefore, no adjustments are needed!*


*The total doesn't matter. The subsets are only partially credible!*

# Credibility is not synonymous with predictability


## Credibility is a statistical measure that cannot identify drivers or assess to what extent they will continue



1918 Influenza epidemic<sup>1</sup>



Linkage between smoking and deaths<sup>1,2</sup>



First focus on likely drivers and their potential future impacts and only use credibility as a secondary measure of statistical fluctuations.

1. CDC Mortality Trends in the United States, 1900-2015  
 2. American Lung Association, Adult Cigarette Smoking Rate Trend by Sex, Race, and Age

### 3 | Understanding the impacts of mix of business

# High-level results may be misleading (1 of 4)

## Equal counts for male and female data



### Illustration of Simpson's paradox

	Male		Female	
	Count	IRR	Count	IRR
Total	1,200	5%	1,200	4%

Naïve conclusion #1: On average, males have greater IRR than females

High-level results may be misleading (2 of 4)  
Changing mix of business over time actually reverses previous conclusion



### Illustration of Simpson's paradox

	Male		Female	
	Count	IRR	Count	IRR
Pre-2007	1000	6%	200	7%
2007+	200	2%	1,000	3%
Total	1,200	5%	1,200	4%


Naïve conclusion #2: For both genders, the IRR is decreasing over time

# High-level results may be misleading (3 of 4)

Graphical representation shows clear linear trends in each cohort, reversing previous conclusion



## Illustration of Simpson's paradox




# High-level results may be misleading (4 of 4)

Generational gaps and changing mix of business can produce counterintuitive results



## Illustration of Simpson's paradox



# Lessons learned



## Traditional interest rate models underestimate volatility

- Historical interest rates are not random walks, but are driven by real-world factors that act as triggers
- Calibrating purely to historical rates ignores these real-world regime changes
- For stress testing, or risk appetite analysis, regime switching interest rate models may capture volatility better than non-regime switching models



## Credibility is (much) less objective than it appears to be

- Credibility is a formulaic framework that may give users a false sense of security
- Users may be making decisions based on somewhat hidden subjective decisions without being fully aware (or disclosing) the implications
- Full credibility does not mean full predictability



## A change in the mix of business may produce counterintuitive results

- Trends in aggregate may not be indicative of trends within subgroups
- Generational shifts need to be well understood
- Data visualization can reveal patterns about trends, data density and help prevent naïve or false conclusions