Description: Three drivers that are often not at the top of lists about the origins of the crisis: a At some level, every entity that handles risks should be assessing what would happen if they ended up owning the risk that they thought they would only have temporarily b The change in the real estate market that was driven by the non-marginal amount of new subprime buyers who came into the market and c Risk managers should always be aware that marginal analysis can produce incorrect results.

Description: Property-liability insurers use reinsurance as a cost-efficient substitute for capital, but in a disruptive event, reinsurance prices and availability can change sharply.

Description: Our current financial crisis has wreaked havoc on the credit markets, the stock market and the entire economy. We must remember that the root cause of this crisis is the collapse of the residential housing market, which has been further exacerbated by the continuing downward housing spiral.

Description: The central question is that of viability. Specifically, is the configuration of life insurers’ products and balance sheets economically viable under current accounting and ongoing market conditions?

Description: This crisis first started with subprime loans and quickly morphed into a credit crisis that eventually engulfed a lot of financial institutions around the world. If a AAA were really a AAA, this crisis would probably have been contained and localized. As the crisis developed, evidence emerged from the shadows that revealed the questionable quality of some AAA-rated MBS or ABS. Subprime loans were the weakest link. As the credit boom came to an end and the economy slowed down further, the Alt-A, prime and credit card loans were also affected. The subprime crisis is only the symptom of a much larger underlying problem. Both consumers and corporations were overleveraged.

Description: In the current financial markets turmoil, it is tempting to ask whether things might have turned out differently. I think the pain in our financial markets would have been less if more actuaries had been involved. 10 reason are offered.

Description: This article presents a hypothesis that the market cycles are primarily created by human actions, behavior and assumptions rather than by random variables. An analysis of main financial events over the last decade reveals that: a Every one of these events has had a human touch b The current financial crisis is an aftermath of the excessive economic boom during this period and c A new economy must emerge from human ingenuity and innovation.

Description: The system of using securities exchanges and commodity futures contract exchanges is inadequate to the task. Neither can transfer the risks of derivative financial contracts to the capital markets. Regardless of the degree of regulation or the financial incentives, this system is insufficient. A new type of exchange is needed that copes with fast price changes – even from “long” to “short” – without inviting bankruptcy.

Description: Interest rates rose from 2004 through 2007, so adjustable mortgage rates increased and many borrowers fell behind. After home prices topped out in 2006, speculators and some buyers who had overstretched found it impossible to refinance. This caused mortgage insurance claims. Insurers may want to study others’ missteps.

Description: Here we are led to draw a distinction between “wild” markets and “free” markets. A wild market is unregulated and unscrutinized. Information flows are purposely impeded for competitive reasons and reduced to trickles from rumor and espionage. No one knows what anyone else is doing, and pricing is blind and haphazard. In such a market, there are no safeguards against anticompetitive behavior and no guarantees that the market will clear. The only guarantee is that there will be liquidity crises.