Description: In this article, the editors introduce the articles in this issue.

Description: Full French version of Risk Management, March 2007, Issue No. 2007.

Description: This paper applies the research in Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky to explain why sales of annuities lag sales of life insurance products. The author theorizes that life insurance is easier to sell because customers perceive themselves to be in the domain of losses, while potential annuity customers perceive themselves to be in the domain of gains. Kahneman and Tversky showed us that people are mostly risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. Purchase of an annuity or life product is a risky investment. Customers will find it easier to take the risk in the life insurance domain of losses than the annuity domain of gains. The author then proposes a hybrid life annuity product that might address both mortality and longevity risk in one product that would allow both products to be more competitive than stand-alone products.

Description: An update to the risk management readers on what the JRMS is planning to do over 2023 to serve its membership.

Description: Strategic Risk Management was given lower priority in a recent survey of ERM Objectives. This article tells how the author believes that recent events have caused many to shift to a more short term focus and in the future there will be a shift back to a priority for the longer term view that stands behind Strategic Risk Management when the environment settles down and things again seem to be more predictable.

Description: This newsletter provides a regulation outlook for the use of AI/ML in insurance industry, interpretations of regulatory expectations and what insurers should consider when managing risks associated with the development, implementation and use of AI/ML models/tools.

Description: An update on the activities of the JRMS

Description: The present crisis in global financial markets has created an impression that enterprise risk management ERM has failed broadly to protect the safety and soundness of the financial system as well as that of many institutions, including insurance companies.

Description: Arguably, many of the fundamental contributing factors to the 2008 mortgage crisis involved misdirected incentives and misinformation available to key participants in the housing finance process. The incentives discussed here include those of the mortgage holders, mortgage intermediaries, mortgage providers, securitizers, raters and CEOs and other highly paid staff of those involved. Unless similar incentives are recognized, future public policy decisions will again fail to avoid this system-wide risk. Since I am most familiar with the U.S. situation, my comments will be limited accordingly.

Description: This crisis first started with subprime loans and quickly morphed into a credit crisis that eventually engulfed a lot of financial institutions around the world. If a AAA were really a AAA, this crisis would probably have been contained and localized. As the crisis developed, evidence emerged from the shadows that revealed the questionable quality of some AAA-rated MBS or ABS. Subprime loans were the weakest link. As the credit boom came to an end and the economy slowed down further, the Alt-A, prime and credit card loans were also affected. The subprime crisis is only the symptom of a much larger underlying problem. Both consumers and corporations were overleveraged.