Description: In preparing claims reserves in the annual statement, health insurers and their opining actuaries will generally include a provision for adverse deviation (PAD) in their reserved amount in order to satisfy language in both in the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Health Annual Statement Instructions and in Actuarial Standards of Practice. This article explores the total level of PAD (both implicit and explicit margin combined) included in the reported claims reserves by examining NAIC filing data from 2016 through 2022.

Description: Update on Health Section research projects and topics, including health care reform, complexity science, and strategic planning.

Description: Any prudent organization that is obligated to cover health claims will consider the risk that those medical claims vastly exceed expectations. This is true for an employer self-funding employee health benefits, a health system contracted with two-way risk (e.g., Accountable Care Organizations ACOs), and a small or mid-sized health insurance company. Without protection, these risk bearers can incur ruinous losses. Interestingly, the forms of insurance sold to cover such large medical claims, although quite similar, sometimes go by different names depending upon the buyer. • Employer Stop-loss (ESL): self-funded employers who want protection against large unanticipated claims • Provider Excess (PXS): at-risk health systems who have taken delegated risk from a public or private payer and desire protection against large unanticipated claims • Medical Excess/HMO Reinsurance (HMO Re): health insurers (including HMOs) who desire protection against large unanticipated claims The concepts we discuss in this article apply to all three categories of large claim risk.

Description: When designing and pricing a healthcare product, it is not only important to know how to model frequency and severity, but it is essential to understand human behavior. Of course, the issue of anti-selection in medical insurance is well known as individuals know more about their health and prior expenditures than an insurer does. This type of behavior is certainly rational, and to be expected.

Description: Inspired by other financial savings products available to Canadians, this article describes a potential solution for financing future health expenses with the creation of a Registered Health Savings Account (RHSA). This solution has been thought on the basis of four premises : 1- Individual Accountability for Health Expenses; 2- Early Savings Leads to More Accumulation; 3-PreferredTax Treatment for Personal Health Savings; 4- Complementing current public and private health systems; Main elements of the RHSA are described (Contributions, Accumulation, Utilization of account, Management by financial institutions).RHSA'S expected balances and some other results under three scenarios (a person in good health, one in poor health, and one with unexpected death at age 45) are summarized in a table. Health expenses deducted yearly from RHSA's balance were estimated using total, per capita, provincial government health expenditures by age-band for Canada, in 2020, from the Canadian Institute of Heath Information’s (CIHI), which account for 71.8% of total expenditures, that is public + private. Thus 28.2% of total expenditures were used for private health expenditures, then forecasted to 2024 and projected using a 4% annual trend. Some objections to the solution explored were anticipated as well as some refutations to these objections.

Description: On average, contracts receiving their first star rating receive 3.20 stars, compared to existing or established contracts receiving 3.90 stars on average. This 0.70 disparity in quality ratings creates significant hardship on new contracts when this lower star rating decreases their payments in the following calendar year. This article explores the disparity in Medicare Advantage Star Ratings between contracts receiving their first star ratings (“New” contracts) and existing contracts, including: 1. Understanding what happens to Medicare Advantage Payments when contracts receive lower star ratings? – What is the Star Rating cliff and why does it matter to new contracts? 2. Explaining when a contract receives their first star rating and how much enrollment this requires – When does the Star Rating cliff occur? 3. Noting which specific star measures “New” contracts struggle with, including those contracts under large parent organizations, contracts with rapid growth, and all other new contracts. – How can my contract avoid the Star Rating cliff?

Description: What is the difference between a Single-Payer and Universal Health Care System, and how could the U.S. implement a system that would reduce the growth of medical costs while increasing quality.

Description: Read the November 26 2019 issue of Health Watch, published by the Health Section. Practical information for actuaries, articles impact sections, section activities.