Description: This is Part 2 of 2 on changes affecting Medigap insurers. It focuses on marketing and regulatory differences between Medigap and Medicare Advantage that affect the competitiveness of Medigap plans.

Description: Update on Health Section research projects and topics, including health care reform, complexity science, and strategic planning.

Description: Any prudent organization that is obligated to cover health claims will consider the risk that those medical claims vastly exceed expectations. This is true for an employer self-funding employee health benefits, a health system contracted with two-way risk (e.g., Accountable Care Organizations ACOs), and a small or mid-sized health insurance company. Without protection, these risk bearers can incur ruinous losses. Interestingly, the forms of insurance sold to cover such large medical claims, although quite similar, sometimes go by different names depending upon the buyer. • Employer Stop-loss (ESL): self-funded employers who want protection against large unanticipated claims • Provider Excess (PXS): at-risk health systems who have taken delegated risk from a public or private payer and desire protection against large unanticipated claims • Medical Excess/HMO Reinsurance (HMO Re): health insurers (including HMOs) who desire protection against large unanticipated claims The concepts we discuss in this article apply to all three categories of large claim risk.

Description: Read the December 2019 issue of Health Watch, published by the Health Section. Practical information for actuaries, articles impact sections, section activities.

Description: When designing and pricing a healthcare product, it is not only important to know how to model frequency and severity, but it is essential to understand human behavior. Of course, the issue of anti-selection in medical insurance is well known as individuals know more about their health and prior expenditures than an insurer does. This type of behavior is certainly rational, and to be expected.

Description: On average, contracts receiving their first star rating receive 3.20 stars, compared to existing or established contracts receiving 3.90 stars on average. This 0.70 disparity in quality ratings creates significant hardship on new contracts when this lower star rating decreases their payments in the following calendar year. This article explores the disparity in Medicare Advantage Star Ratings between contracts receiving their first star ratings (“New” contracts) and existing contracts, including: 1. Understanding what happens to Medicare Advantage Payments when contracts receive lower star ratings? – What is the Star Rating cliff and why does it matter to new contracts? 2. Explaining when a contract receives their first star rating and how much enrollment this requires – When does the Star Rating cliff occur? 3. Noting which specific star measures “New” contracts struggle with, including those contracts under large parent organizations, contracts with rapid growth, and all other new contracts. – How can my contract avoid the Star Rating cliff?

Description: What is the difference between a Single-Payer and Universal Health Care System, and how could the U.S. implement a system that would reduce the growth of medical costs while increasing quality.

Description: Read the November 26 2019 issue of Health Watch, published by the Health Section. Practical information for actuaries, articles impact sections, section activities.

Description: Read the February 2020 issue of Health Watch, published by the Health Section. Practical information for actuaries, articles impact sections, section activities.