Description: This article provides an overview of behavioral economic theory as it relates to health and welfare insurance plans and provides summaries of two sample applications of the theories: enrollment in health insurance exchanges created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and product design considerations in light of vast health illiteracy.

Description: Read the October 2019 issue of Health Watch, published by the Health Section. Practical information for actuaries, articles impact sections, section activities. This is the first digital-only issue of the newsletter.

Description: Inspired by other financial savings products available to Canadians, this article describes a potential solution for financing future health expenses with the creation of a Registered Health Savings Account (RHSA). This solution has been thought on the basis of four premises : 1- Individual Accountability for Health Expenses; 2- Early Savings Leads to More Accumulation; 3-PreferredTax Treatment for Personal Health Savings; 4- Complementing current public and private health systems; Main elements of the RHSA are described (Contributions, Accumulation, Utilization of account, Management by financial institutions).RHSA'S expected balances and some other results under three scenarios (a person in good health, one in poor health, and one with unexpected death at age 45) are summarized in a table. Health expenses deducted yearly from RHSA's balance were estimated using total, per capita, provincial government health expenditures by age-band for Canada, in 2020, from the Canadian Institute of Heath Information’s (CIHI), which account for 71.8% of total expenditures, that is public + private. Thus 28.2% of total expenditures were used for private health expenditures, then forecasted to 2024 and projected using a 4% annual trend. Some objections to the solution explored were anticipated as well as some refutations to these objections.

Description: On average, contracts receiving their first star rating receive 3.20 stars, compared to existing or established contracts receiving 3.90 stars on average. This 0.70 disparity in quality ratings creates significant hardship on new contracts when this lower star rating decreases their payments in the following calendar year. This article explores the disparity in Medicare Advantage Star Ratings between contracts receiving their first star ratings (“New” contracts) and existing contracts, including: 1. Understanding what happens to Medicare Advantage Payments when contracts receive lower star ratings? – What is the Star Rating cliff and why does it matter to new contracts? 2. Explaining when a contract receives their first star rating and how much enrollment this requires – When does the Star Rating cliff occur? 3. Noting which specific star measures “New” contracts struggle with, including those contracts under large parent organizations, contracts with rapid growth, and all other new contracts. – How can my contract avoid the Star Rating cliff?