Description: Arguably, many of the fundamental contributing factors to the 2008 mortgage crisis involved misdirected incentives and misinformation available to key participants in the housing finance process. The incentives discussed here include those of the mortgage holders, mortgage intermediaries, mortgage providers, securitizers, raters and CEOs and other highly paid staff of those involved. Unless similar incentives are recognized, future public policy decisions will again fail to avoid this system-wide risk. Since I am most familiar with the U.S. situation, my comments will be limited accordingly.

Description: This crisis first started with subprime loans and quickly morphed into a credit crisis that eventually engulfed a lot of financial institutions around the world. If a AAA were really a AAA, this crisis would probably have been contained and localized. As the crisis developed, evidence emerged from the shadows that revealed the questionable quality of some AAA-rated MBS or ABS. Subprime loans were the weakest link. As the credit boom came to an end and the economy slowed down further, the Alt-A, prime and credit card loans were also affected. The subprime crisis is only the symptom of a much larger underlying problem. Both consumers and corporations were overleveraged.

Description: Modern economies are based on the premise that all the main players look after themselves. The bankruptcy and limited liability laws gave property speculators and banks a put option on society so they could walk away from losses above their capital base, yet enjoy all the gains of such speculation. They acted in what they believed were their own interests. It seems that society – well aware of what was happening – did not effectively look after its own interest and now must pay the price.

Description: As one highly rated financial firm after another blows up, what is the right conclusion to draw about enterprise risk management ERM? Does the financial crisis of 2008-09 demonstrate its criticality, or does it bring the whole concept into disrepute?

Description: This article presents a hypothesis that the market cycles are primarily created by human actions, behavior and assumptions rather than by random variables. An analysis of main financial events over the last decade reveals that: a Every one of these events has had a human touch b The current financial crisis is an aftermath of the excessive economic boom during this period and c A new economy must emerge from human ingenuity and innovation.

Description: In the current financial markets turmoil, it is tempting to ask whether things might have turned out differently. I think the pain in our financial markets would have been less if more actuaries had been involved. 10 reason are offered.

Description: The current financial crisis underscores the need for companies to take a sobering look at their approach to risk management. Among the many lessons to be learned, one is immediately clear: The subprime debacle represents a failure in risk management, rather than a failure of risk management.

Description: Here we are led to draw a distinction between “wild” markets and “free” markets. A wild market is unregulated and unscrutinized. Information flows are purposely impeded for competitive reasons and reduced to trickles from rumor and espionage. No one knows what anyone else is doing, and pricing is blind and haphazard. In such a market, there are no safeguards against anticompetitive behavior and no guarantees that the market will clear. The only guarantee is that there will be liquidity crises.

Description: Property-liability insurers use reinsurance as a cost-efficient substitute for capital, but in a disruptive event, reinsurance prices and availability can change sharply.

Description: The central question is that of viability. Specifically, is the configuration of life insurers’ products and balance sheets economically viable under current accounting and ongoing market conditions?