Description: GDP growth has slowed as numerous headwinds have emerged. This article summarizes a research paper by Mark Alberts and Max Rudolph that addresses reasons why this is so and how risk managers can address using scenarios.

Description: While the major market crash subsequent to the widespread contagion of the COVID-19 virus was readily predictable, the rapid recovery and ongoing growth subsequent to it was not. Market dynamics around the recovery resist characterization by most traditional analytical approaches. In examining the circumstances around the emergence of a large retail class of investors, one sees that ingrained human tendencies, particularly optimism bias, have fueled much investor behavior responsible for the recovery. Understanding this makes it possible to predict potential future crashes and develop behavioral interventions for subsequent market recoveries.

Description: October issue of Taxing Times

Description: This article discusses how the industry as a whole is revisiting its risk management strategies in the wake of the financial crisis.

Description: The recent financial crisis created incentives to review investment practices and see what was done well and what could be improved for the future. Looking inward at insurer investment practices, background trend information was generated and a survey developed for insurers to share their thoughts. The research continued with conversations in private and public forums, where initial conclusions were expanded.

Description: This session will present results of the most recent SOA/LIMRA studies of variable and fixed-indexed annuity policyholder behavior including withdrawal behavior, guaranteed living benefit elections and surrender activity. Conducted annually since 2006, a discussion on the results of these studies show how they have changed over time, as well as areas where the analysis will need to change or expand. After that, the presenters will focus on dynamic lapse for hot money businesses, which is an important topic for fixed deferred annuity. Key takeaways from this area will include an understanding how to differentiate between hot money and warm money, the different formulas used in the industry, and how to adjust an asset portfolio to protect against the risks associated with hot money businesses.

Description: This is an Excel workbook, provided by the Society of Actuaries Pension Section, containing consumer price index data obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics. Separate tabs include figures for the CPI-U, the Medical Care Consumer Price Index, etc.

Description: Appendix E is round 2 on comments on application of judgmental methods from the Delphi study. See the SOA Website Research section for the full Delphi Study of Economic Variables Report along with all the variables.

Description: Arguably, many of the fundamental contributing factors to the 2008 mortgage crisis involved misdirected incentives and misinformation available to key participants in the housing finance process. The incentives discussed here include those of the mortgage holders, mortgage intermediaries, mortgage providers, securitizers, raters and CEOs and other highly paid staff of those involved. Unless similar incentives are recognized, future public policy decisions will again fail to avoid this system-wide risk. Since I am most familiar with the U.S. situation, my comments will be limited accordingly.

Description: This crisis first started with subprime loans and quickly morphed into a credit crisis that eventually engulfed a lot of financial institutions around the world. If a AAA were really a AAA, this crisis would probably have been contained and localized. As the crisis developed, evidence emerged from the shadows that revealed the questionable quality of some AAA-rated MBS or ABS. Subprime loans were the weakest link. As the credit boom came to an end and the economy slowed down further, the Alt-A, prime and credit card loans were also affected. The subprime crisis is only the symptom of a much larger underlying problem. Both consumers and corporations were overleveraged.