Description: This session 15 PD of the Toronto Spring Meeting includes an update on specific approaches adopted by Canadian insurers and regulators to deal with capital guarantees on segregated fund products, capital modeling in the Canadian banking industry, and emerging issues using these techniques in the U.S. From the Record of the Society of Actuaries, Volume 27, No. 2, Session

Description: This session from the 2003 Washington D.C. Spring Meeting discusses the recent economic conditions in Europe, Asia and North America and the changes in product design and risk management that have taken place to address such financial risk. From the Record of the Society of Actuaries, Volume 29, No. 1, Session 77PD.

Description: In this session 116 PD of the New York Annual Meeting the panel discusses factors which led to the development of alternative risk transfer transactions in the property and casualty markets, and review techniques used to transfer and trade insurance risks within the capital markets. From the Record of the Society of Actuaries, Vol. 24, No. 3.

Description: This presentation from the 2011 46th Actuarial Research Conference is about the Haezendonck-Goovaerts risk measure for extreme risks.

Description: Learn industry best practices including challenges faced by retirees, such as needing exposure to growth, most exposed to sequencing risk, and the need for smooth returns to avoid poor investor behavior caused by risk aversion. Other topics will include how to set investment objectives which consider the members’ real-world needs and how to build portfolios and implement risk management strategies to meet those objectives. The speaker will provide real-life examples/case studies.

Description: Read the July 2020 issue of Risk Management published by the Joint Risk Management Section. Newsletters provide practical information for the working actuary, articles on trends that impact sections and news about section activities.

Description: The roots of the crisis are understood on a simplified basis, by 3 Ls: a Lack of accountability b Leverage and c Liquidity. Historically, people requiring mortgages sought their mortgages from local institutions that would conduct the evaluation and hold the risk. Loan officers of these institutions were accountable for the outcomes of their decisions – defaults were a direct reflection on their judgment. Leverage was a second key factor. Institutions guaranteed mortgages against default. The third L, liquidity, because a problem. When property values eventually evidenced their inevitable fall, defaults occurred at historically high rates.