Description: Consumer groups fear that the use of genetic testing information in insurance underwriting might lead to the creation of an underclass of individuals who cannot obtain insurance. Thus, these groups want to ban insurance companies from accessing genetic test results. Insurers contend that such a ban might lead to adverse selection that could threaten their financial solvency. To investigate the potential effect of adverse selection in a term life insurance market, a discrete-time, discrete-state, Markov chain is used to track the evolution of 12 closed cohorts of women, differentiated by family history of breast and ovarian cancer and age-at-issue of a 20-year annually renewable term life insurance policy. The insurance demand behavior of these women is tracked, incorporating elastic demand for insurance. During the 20-year period, women may get tested for BRCA 1/2 mutations. Each year, the insurer calculates profits/losses to date and expected future benefit payouts which determines the following year’s premium schedule. At the end of each policy year, women can change their life insurance benefit, influenced by their testing status and premium changes. Adverse selection could result from differentiated: 1. benefits following test results, 2. lapse rates according to test results, and 3. reactions to price increases. It is concluded that with realistic estimates of behavioral parameters, adverse selection should be a manageable problem for insurers. From Actuarial Research Clearing House 2004, Vol. 1.

Description: Results of a company practice survey is presented. Among the areas to be addressed include the structure of accelerated underwriting programs, how programs are monitored, how accelerated underwritten business is performing relative to expectations, and how companies are considering accelerated underwriting cohorts in the context of VM-20 assumption setting.

Description: This article discusses whether or not the Preferred risk class wears off over time.

Description: Panelelists at this session at the SOA 1998 Maui I Spring Meeting present their thoughts on how life and disability risk assessment and underwriting might be performed in the 21st century. Focus is on how technology can change and speed up the process.

Description: This session at the SOA 1981 New York Regional Meeting examines the practice of life insurance risk classification, societal changes in their view of the practice and the industry's response to those pressures.

Description: This presentation is an open forum from the 1991 Annual Meeting of the Society of Actuaries, held October 20-23 in Toronto. The panelists, including a member of the Association of Life Insurance Medical Directors, and a vice president of the largest insurance testing lab, Home Office Reference Lab, discuss new underwriting technologies, including genetic testing, alternative AIDS testing methods, and the legal and other implications. Discussion from participants is included. From the Record of Society of Actuaries, Volume 17, No. 4A.

Description: This article provides a summary of “Insurance Coverage for ALL: And How Insurers Can Afford to Provide It”, a session at a recent SOA meeting.

Description: This session at the SOA 1990 San Francisco Spring Meeting presents an overview of risk classification, what principles define a sound system, changes in underwriting due to expert system technology, and determining the value of laboratory tests.

Description: This session at the SOA 1990 Annual Meeting includes discussion of an historical review of underwriting practices, preferred class underwriting, laboratory testing, facultative reinsurance, and mortality results. Latin America experience is also presented.

Description: This article explains how one company, American Life of New York, is using innovative applications to improve and speed the underwriting process.