Description: The IRS released the details of a program to allow life insurers to correct inadvertent failures to comply with the modified endowment MEC rules under section 7702A of the Internal Revenue Code the “Code”.

Description: This article discusses an update to a survey that focuses on how companies are trying to price for and understand the risks inherent in the products they sell.

Description: This article discusses the charge for the new SOA/COVARA AIDS Task Force. This new task force will examine and report on the principles and techniques for the financial recognition of AIDS for insurance companies, recognizing both statutory and GAAP accounting.

Description: Small Talk Newsletter, June 2005, Issue No. 24. Last fall, the Internal Revenue Service IRS released Notice 2004-61, 2004-41 I.R.B. 596 October 12, 2004, interpreting the reasonable mortality charge requirement applicable to life insurance contracts under Section 7702 of the Internal Revenue Code.

Description: This article details the IRS' Revenue Ruling 2005-6. This ruling provides formal guidance on how to treat family term riders for purposes of the computational limit calculations in Internal Revenue Code IRC sections 7702 and 7702A i.e., calculations of net single premiums, guideline single premiums, guideline level premiums and 7-pay premiums. From Small Talk Newsletter, June 2005, Issue No. 24.

Description: This article compares computing a single premium for a decreasing term policy using continuous functions versus curtate functions.

Description: This article discusses the calculation of mean reserves in certain cases where terminal reserves are negative and proposes a minimum reserve formula which produces adequate mean reserves in all cases.

Description: The Actuary Vol. 22 , No. 7. This articles explores the dangers posed by many guaranteed-return life insurance and annuity products.

Description: This paper applies the research in Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky to explain why sales of annuities lag sales of life insurance products. The author theorizes that life insurance is easier to sell because customers perceive themselves to be in the domain of losses, while potential annuity customers perceive themselves to be in the domain of gains. Kahneman and Tversky showed us that people are mostly risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. Purchase of an annuity or life product is a risky investment. Customers will find it easier to take the risk in the life insurance domain of losses than the annuity domain of gains. The author then proposes a hybrid life annuity product that might address both mortality and longevity risk in one product that would allow both products to be more competitive than stand-alone products.

Description: Summary of recent changes to IRS Section 7702 Interest Rates, and how it will impact the design of life insurance products in the future.