Description: 1999 SOA Annual Meeting, San Francisco. This is Table 1 Product/Channel Directory that is associated with Building Bridges with Session 136IF: Building Bridges with Alternative Marketing Methods

Description: On average, contracts receiving their first star rating receive 3.20 stars, compared to existing or established contracts receiving 3.90 stars on average. This 0.70 disparity in quality ratings creates significant hardship on new contracts when this lower star rating decreases their payments in the following calendar year. This article explores the disparity in Medicare Advantage Star Ratings between contracts receiving their first star ratings (“New” contracts) and existing contracts, including: 1. Understanding what happens to Medicare Advantage Payments when contracts receive lower star ratings? – What is the Star Rating cliff and why does it matter to new contracts? 2. Explaining when a contract receives their first star rating and how much enrollment this requires – When does the Star Rating cliff occur? 3. Noting which specific star measures “New” contracts struggle with, including those contracts under large parent organizations, contracts with rapid growth, and all other new contracts. – How can my contract avoid the Star Rating cliff?

Description: Actuarial Perspectives on COVID-19: June 10 Twitter Chat with the Society of Actuaries

Description: Numerous behavioral finance theories have emerged in recent years, many of which apply to insurance. The presenters look at key theories and their use in explaining, predicting and inducing behavior from the perspective of the health insurance customer journey.

Description: Any prudent organization that is obligated to cover health claims will consider the risk that those medical claims vastly exceed expectations. This is true for an employer self-funding employee health benefits, a health system contracted with two-way risk (e.g., Accountable Care Organizations ACOs), and a small or mid-sized health insurance company. Without protection, these risk bearers can incur ruinous losses. Interestingly, the forms of insurance sold to cover such large medical claims, although quite similar, sometimes go by different names depending upon the buyer. • Employer Stop-loss (ESL): self-funded employers who want protection against large unanticipated claims • Provider Excess (PXS): at-risk health systems who have taken delegated risk from a public or private payer and desire protection against large unanticipated claims • Medical Excess/HMO Reinsurance (HMO Re): health insurers (including HMOs) who desire protection against large unanticipated claims The concepts we discuss in this article apply to all three categories of large claim risk.

Description: Subtitle: My real-life connection to (almost) every supplemental product Data is king, but maybe it should be dethroned once in a while so we can better understand the "why" behind the data.

Description: This is Part 2 of 2 on changes affecting Medigap insurers. It focuses on marketing and regulatory differences between Medigap and Medicare Advantage that affect the competitiveness of Medigap plans.

Description: Lower costs doesn't necessarily help ACA markets. It often makes things worse.

Description: During the past few years, performance, cost, and risk trends for Medigap products have undergone substantial changes. Some of these trends could ease cost pressures on Medigap insurers, while others might increase them. Part 1 of this Issue Brief article discusses current changing trends and considerations around about how they are impacting Medigap.

Description: 1999 SOA Annual Meeting, San Francisco. Presenters discussed ways in which nontraditional methods of distributing insurance products are continuing to evolve and offered their views on where that evolution may lead for the industry.