Description: Highlight of the ERM Symposium

Description: Essays advocating for incentive compensation linked to the level of risk in an organization.

Description: Increasing uncertainties and volatility in financial as well as real goods markets increasingly reveal that controlling systems based on deterministic and pseudo-exact values are insufficiently eligible to manage the business activities. This raises the question how management systems can be modified to generate the adequate management impulses in volatile periods. Risk management deals from identifying, evaluating and aggregating chances and risks, which again determine the potential fluctuation range of relevant performance indicators. Everyday corporate life shows that risk management is considered important; but the corresponding processes to identify, evaluate and report chances and risks are seldom part of established decision criteria. This “paradox” lets assume that risks are managed in various differing and unsystematic ways. The combination of traditional controlling methods and risk management is not primarily a methodological challenge. The behavior of the whole organization, practiced over a long-year period, has to be transferred into a new corporate culture of transparent dealing with chances and risks. This paper describes the necessary change management process, which has to come along with necessary methodological modifications.

Description: Essays advocating for incentive compensation linked to the level of risk in an organization.

Description: Description of considerations and perspectives to be taken into account by incentive compensation plans.

Description: Response to David Kausch’s comments on the paper.

Description: A discussion of the hidden costs of bringing innovative products to market, including the costs of expertise gaps and opportunity costs

Description: This article discusses some of the ideas of pension finance, how to present such information, and how it was presented to the New York City Retirement Systems (NYCRS) in a way that made it available to other interested parties, including the public.

Description: Essays advocating for incentive compensation linked to the level of risk in an organization.

Description: Demonstrating that incentive maximization could lead to failure using game theory. This is illustrated by the optimum strategy for the Prisoner Dilemma single period, multi period and infinite period that could be mutually destructive or beneficial.