Description: Obsolescence of physical assets and processes is a major component of operational risk for some companies. A simulation experiment shows that managers, who consider the retirement and replacement of individual assets in isolation, have rational incentives, due to risk aversion and uncertainty, to defer the replacement of assets past a time that is optimal from the perspective of the shareholder who owns the entire portfolio of such assets. This results in measurable wealth destruction, —and a demonstrable opportunity to significantly enhance a company’s value. A practical decision model for the replacement timing of fixed, physical assets, which creates wealth by minimizing the long-term consumption of scarce resources, is provided.

Description: In this study the author will review some correlations between the operating income per employee and some elements of company structure for the S&P 500 that are proxies for management control and supervision. An analysis yielded the following general observations: 1 companies in which the chairman and CEO roles are combined generate more income per employee than those in which the roles are separate 2 companies with a lead director and the chairman and CEO combined typically do better still 3 the more executive officers a company has, the higher operating income is generated per employee although this decreases marginally and 4 companies tend to gravitate toward a structure with 10 executive officers and 10 directors this is a fixed point of an iterative decision function. Presented at 2010 Enterprise Risk Management Symposium, Society of Actuaries, April 12-15, 2010.