Description: This article discusses the current state of the IAIS' initiative on their group Insurance Capital Standard.

Description: The article is based on a study of causes of insolvency and decisions made by management, regulators, and policyholders over the life cycle of the insolvency.

Description: Many top-performing businesses aren’t just risk aware, but rather risk intelligent. Such a posture helps prepare companies for a major event and can demonstrate to a regulator or auditor that an appropriately strong control framework is in place. Better still, companies gain real strategic value from a “risk adjusted” understanding not only of their threats and vulnerabilities, but also the upside opportunities associated with various risks. It starts with having both qualitative and quantitative information to identify, assess and manage risks. Strategic risk management, at its core, is about creating value by increasing transparency and accountability, and quality of information. More than a mere compliance exercise, effective risk management enables more informed strategic decision making, increased accountability and transparency, a greater likelihood of organizational success, and – ultimately – competitive advantage, as borne out by many studies that correlate risk management and financial results.

Description: From a session at a meeting of the Society of Actuaries held in San Diego, CA, June 22-23, 2000 A discussion of liquidity management for life insurance companies marketing institutional clients, in particular with respect to GIC contracts and Funding agreements. Topics included: · What happened at General American with their defaults on funding agreements. Why did the regulators and rating agencies miss the problems? · What was the impact of reinsurance? · What is the effect of adding institutional business such as putable funding agreements on liquidity management? · Are there prudent levels of this business that can be beneficial? · What is the effect of funding agreements with downgrade provisions on liquidity risks, and do such provisions create a preference for sophisticated institutional contract holders?