Description: This paper applies the research in Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky to explain why sales of annuities lag sales of life insurance products. The author theorizes that life insurance is easier to sell because customers perceive themselves to be in the domain of losses, while potential annuity customers perceive themselves to be in the domain of gains. Kahneman and Tversky showed us that people are mostly risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. Purchase of an annuity or life product is a risky investment. Customers will find it easier to take the risk in the life insurance domain of losses than the annuity domain of gains. The author then proposes a hybrid life annuity product that might address both mortality and longevity risk in one product that would allow both products to be more competitive than stand-alone products.

Description: This paper applies the research in Prospect Theory of Kahneman and Tversky to explain why sales of annuities lag sales of life insurance products. The author theorizes that life insurance is easier to sell because customers perceive themselves to be in the domain of losses, while potential annuity customers perceive themselves to be in the domain of gains. Kahneman and Tversky showed us that people are mostly risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. Purchase of an annuity or life product is a risky investment. Customers will find it easier to take the risk in the life insurance domain of losses than the annuity domain of gains. The author then proposes a hybrid life annuity product that might address both mortality and longevity risk in one product that would allow both products to be more competitive than stand-alone products.

Description: This section presents and summarizes several insurance-related legal cases from 1954: 1. ACCIDENT POLICY- ACCIDENTAL MEANS: Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Douglass, 2. SUICIDE EXCLUSIONDATE OF ISSUE AND EFFECTIVE DATE: New York Life Insurance Company v. Noonan, 3. INCOME TAX DEFICIENCYGOVERNMENT'S CLAIM AGAINST BENEFICIARY: United States vs. New. 4. BANKRUPTCYPOLICY LOANS MADE AFTER APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEE: Lake, Trustee vs. New York Life Insurance Company, 5. ANNUITY CONTRAcTRECOVERY OF CONSIDERATION: Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company vs. Hardwick, 6. DOUBLE INDEMNITYWAIVER OF AGE LIMIT: Peninsular Life Insurance Company vs. Howard, 7. DEATH ON POLICY ANNIVERSARYDEDUCTION OF UNPAID PREMIUM: Callahan vs. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, 8. GOOD HEALTH PROVISIONSUBSTANDARD RISK: Green vs. Acacia Mutual Life Insurance Company, 9. INSURANCE TRUSTTESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION: Gordon v. Portland Trust Bank, 10. MISREPRESENTATION AS TO INSANITYINCONTESTABLE CLAUSE: Arnold vs. Life Insurance Company of Georgia, 11. ACCIDENT INSURANCEBURNING OF BUILDING: Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company vs. Walt

Description: The paper summarizes results from two doctoral dissertations. The first discusses integration of insurance products with investment products to mitigate the risk of outliving one’s assets. The second discusses modeling and pricing for the longevity risk in the secondary market in insurance, including a provision for adverse deviation PAD.

Description: The question of sex discrimination in employee pension plans in life insurance programs is only part of the more general issue of risk classification. Challenges to the old ways of classifying risks are not limited to pensions or to life insurance. It also impacts auto insurance, health insurance, and all other areas. However, for this discussion we will concentrate on sex discrimination in pension and retirement plans. From Record of the Society of Actuaries 1979, Volume 5, No. 1.

Description: Discusses the extent to which various influences are reflected in premiums, dividends and settlement options: improved mortality, interest rate trends, federal taxes, agent compensation and increasing expenses.

Description: The NAIC approved the 2012 Individual Annuity Reserve table as the standard for computing reserves for individual annuity contracts and developed a model law regulation for states to adopt. On February 17th, 2015, ACLI submitted a letter to Alexis MacIvor, Chief of the Insurance Branch in the IRS Office of Chief Counsel, notifying her that as of December 24, 2014, 26 states had approved the 2012 IAR Table as the reserve standard for immediate annuity contracts issued on or after January 1, 2015. The letter thus confirms that the 2012 IAR Table is the Prevailing Commissioners' Standard Table for purposes of computing life insurance reserves under section 807(d) of the Code for individual annuity contracts.

Description: Embedded Risk in Settlement Options on Older Life and Annuity Contracts

Description: A. Discusssion of the practical considerations involved in deciding whether or not to adopt projected mortality rates in connection with individual annuities, settlement options, retirement income policies, and the various forms of group annuities. B. In view of increased administrative expenses, discussion of the arguments for and against imposing limitations on the granting of settlement options with respect to size of policy, including the practicality of providing for the expense of administering supplementary contracts other than through the use of conservative mortality and interest assumptions.