Description: Information about Incentive Compensation Determination.

Description: This article discusses the idea of using management instead of incentive comp to motivate employees.

Description: This article discusses how unemployment and underemployment information can help improve economic forecasts, insurance assumption setting and risk management. It summarizes the current modeling practices of unemployment which shows a deficiency of using unemployment/ underemployment information in actuarial works. It also gives three examples of using unemployment/underemployment information for economic assumption setting, new business growth prediction and stress scenarios related to the labor market.

Description: The Joint Risk Management Section conducted its fourth survey of emerging risks in fall 2010 in light of the BP oil spill which brought the impact of various risk combinations to the fore.

Description: Could it be that the depth of our current crisis is related to our failure to find an economic goal other than continuous “growth” as it’s been measured for decades? As painful as it may be, we can view the current crisis as a wake-up call. Rather than trying desperately to restore a “healthy” economy, perhaps it’s time to try building a truly healthy economy – one where we don’t keep promoting consumption of any and all kinds at the expense of saving and investing for the future.

Description: This article discusses how the industry as a whole is revisiting its risk management strategies in the wake of the financial crisis.

Description: This article introduces a non-traditional type of economic scenario generator that relies on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are complex macroeconomics models and have been increasingly popular in central banks for analyzing monetary policies.

Description: This article discusses creating a good organizational strategy for incentive compensation plans.

Description: Arguably, many of the fundamental contributing factors to the 2008 mortgage crisis involved misdirected incentives and misinformation available to key participants in the housing finance process. The incentives discussed here include those of the mortgage holders, mortgage intermediaries, mortgage providers, securitizers, raters and CEOs and other highly paid staff of those involved. Unless similar incentives are recognized, future public policy decisions will again fail to avoid this system-wide risk. Since I am most familiar with the U.S. situation, my comments will be limited accordingly.

Description: This crisis first started with subprime loans and quickly morphed into a credit crisis that eventually engulfed a lot of financial institutions around the world. If a AAA were really a AAA, this crisis would probably have been contained and localized. As the crisis developed, evidence emerged from the shadows that revealed the questionable quality of some AAA-rated MBS or ABS. Subprime loans were the weakest link. As the credit boom came to an end and the economy slowed down further, the Alt-A, prime and credit card loans were also affected. The subprime crisis is only the symptom of a much larger underlying problem. Both consumers and corporations were overleveraged.