Description: This model arose from a project to evaluate the cost of a health care access' program to provide comprehensive medical care to uninsureds in Minnesota, for the Minnesota Health Care Access Commission. The project was to provide estimates of the impact on per-person and aggregate costs for various participation percentages in the access program. In order to evaluate those costs, the antiselection model described in this was developed. Of note, this was the ACTUARIAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH FUND 1991 PRACTITIONERS AWARD WINNER. From Actuarial Research Clearing House 1991, VOL. 2.

Description: Family members who care for people with dementia need a wide range of support services to help them do the important work of care giving at home.

Description: This article provides an overview of behavioral economic theory as it relates to health and welfare insurance plans and provides summaries of two sample applications of the theories: enrollment in health insurance exchanges created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and product design considerations in light of vast health illiteracy.

Description: CMS provides a significant and growing amount of information that can be leveraged by actuaries. Between the public use and research files CMS makes publicly available, large amounts of information that can be assimilated to help understand the who, what, when, where and how of Medicare. With the CMS allowance of supplemental benefits to address SDOH, adding SDOH data into your data landscape is critical to better understand your members' cost drivers. The presenters will focus on the depth and breadth of data available, summarize any restrictions on the use of the data, and identify areas where access to the new data can provide more meaningful insights.

Description: Methods and assumptions used in the valuation of savings by external care vendors

Description: On average, contracts receiving their first star rating receive 3.20 stars, compared to existing or established contracts receiving 3.90 stars on average. This 0.70 disparity in quality ratings creates significant hardship on new contracts when this lower star rating decreases their payments in the following calendar year. This article explores the disparity in Medicare Advantage Star Ratings between contracts receiving their first star ratings (“New” contracts) and existing contracts, including: 1. Understanding what happens to Medicare Advantage Payments when contracts receive lower star ratings? – What is the Star Rating cliff and why does it matter to new contracts? 2. Explaining when a contract receives their first star rating and how much enrollment this requires – When does the Star Rating cliff occur? 3. Noting which specific star measures “New” contracts struggle with, including those contracts under large parent organizations, contracts with rapid growth, and all other new contracts. – How can my contract avoid the Star Rating cliff?